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The macroeconomic environment interacts with the firms’ balance sheet structure in a two-
way relation. On one hand the macroeconomic environment is central in shaping the capital 
markets, determining what kind of contracts are feasible and enforceable. Moreover, it also 
affects the incentives faced by firms when selecting its financial contracts. Conversely, the firms’ 
balance sheet structure affects crucially the result of macroeconomic policies, influencing 
policymakers’ choices of regimes and policy rules. In this paper we study how this interaction 
evolved in Brazil since 1990. In order to analyze the balance sheet effects properly we need to 
use a panel data set with firm level variables. 
In Brazil, the macroeconomic environment changed drastically in the last 12 years. The first 
important change was the trade liberalization, which occurred in the early 1990’s.  
Simultaneously, there was a financial liberalization, which increased the access of Brazilian firms 
to foreign liabilities. The Real plan in 1994 also contributed to unveil the new incentives. 
Furthermore, the end of high inflation contributed for the strengthening of credit relations and for 
the lengthening of debt maturities. This first period of stabilization (1994-1998) was 
characterized by low volatility of the exchange rate, which was kept almost fixed in real terms. 
Of course, this had a counterpart in high interest rate volatility. In the beginning of 1999 the 
exchange rate was allowed to float. This change of exchange rate regime was complemented by 
the adoption of an inflation targeting monetary regime. As a result, exchange rate became very 
volatile while interest rate policy became focused on bringing inflation to target. 
The first set of interesting questions we tackle concerns how the macroeconomic environment 
affects the balance sheet structure. How did the balance sheet structure change from high 
inflation period before the Real plan to the first period of Real plan, when exchange rate was 
under a crawling peg? Did the subsequent regime of free-floating exchange rates and inflation 
targeting induced a different balance sheet structure? How the capital markets development were 
influenced by the macroeconomic environment in the last decade? 
The second set of questions is related to the balance sheet effects of macroeconomic policy. 
What were the balance sheet effects of interest rates before the Real plan and after the Real plan 
when exchange rates were pegged? What were the effects of exchange rate and interest rates in 
the free-floating exchange rate and inflation-targeting regime? What were the balance sheet 
effects of exchange rate in each one of the three periods? 
Those are the more general questions we would like to answer. In order to answer those 
questions is necessary to tackle a larger set of specific questions related to the investigation of the 
determinants of firms’ liability composition and balance sheet effects. The latter issue has been 
explored recently in the literature.  
It has been argued that a devaluation of exchange rate might reduce economic activity  
because the financial situation of dollar-indebted firms could deteriorate (Aghion, Bacchetta and 
Banerjee, 2001). Additionally, the existence of imported inputs could also be an extra channel for 
a contractionary effect (Reif, 2001). Both effects could offset the traditional competitiveness 
effect, according to which exchange rate devaluations are expansionary. 
Bleakley and Cowan (2002) and Forbes (2002) tested the empirical relevance of those effects. 
The former work used a panel data for over 500 non-financial firms in five Latin American 
countries, dominated by Brazilian firms (52,5% of the observations). They found that holding 
foreign-currency denominated debt was associated with more investment during exchange rate 
devaluations, contrary to the predicted sign. On the other hand, Forbes (2002) found that more   3 
indebted firms had lower net income growth after a large depreciation. Although she used a 
larger sample of countries, she only examined large depreciations.  
Another balance sheet effect could result from an increase in interest rate, because firms with 
a relatively large magnitude of short-term debt would have a reduction in their cash flow. 
Balance sheet effect of interest rates is the focus of the credit channel literature. According to this 
literature, capital market imperfections create a wedge between internal and external finance. As 
a consequence, variables related to the availability of internal funds and collateral as cash flow 
and net worth become an important determinant of investment. An increase in interest rate can 
lead to the deterioration of the financial situation of firms with more fragile financial condition, 
augmenting the contractionary impact of interest rates due to the traditional  channel (see 
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist , 1998). 
As a consequence, both exchange rate and interest rate balance sheet effects depend on the 
importance of capital market imperfections. At firm level, investment is the candidate variable 
potentially more influenced by balance sheet effects. Balance sheet effects might additionally 
affect production. Since this variable was not available, we chose sales, which is somewhat 
related, as our second variable. The specific balance sheet effects, related to exchange rate 
variation or interest rates, should all affect the firm through cash flow deterioration. For that 
reason, we also single out firms’ cash flow as our third dependent variable. 
We do several tests for the balance sheet effect. First we tested the same equation as Bleakley 
and Cowan (2002), and we found a significant negative effect of firm’s dollar indebtedness on 
investment when exchange rate is devalued. We then test a different specification based on the 
credit channel tradition. Our results provide evidence for both imperfect capital markets and for 
the existence of balance sheet effects of exchange rate and interest rate. Both imperfect capital 
markets and substantial firms’ indebtedness are necessary conditions for balance sheet effects. 
The evidence for capital market imperfections is stronger in the first subperiod (1990-1994). 
However, this period was characterized by high inflation and low financial intermediation. The 
evidence of balance sheet effects is concentrated in the subperiod of free-floating exchange rate 
and inflation targeting (1999-2001). This is not surprising when we take into account that in this 
period financial intermediation was higher and exchange rate fluctuations more important.  
We proceed as follows. In the next section we describe our database. In section 3, we study 
the determinants of the balance sheet structure in Brazil in the last 12 years. In section 4, we 
investigate the existence of balance sheet effects in Brazil through dynamic panel data 
estimations using firm level data. The last section concludes.  
 
   4 
2. Database Description 
 
This section describes the sample and variables under study. Our main data consists of firm-
level accounting information for Brazilian non-financial corporations and country-level data, 
organized as a panel data set. The time period under investigation ranges from 1990 to 2001, with 
yearly observations
1. 
Balance-sheet data are taken from Economática for publicly traded companies. Additionally, 
we have data describing the firm’s ownership structure and reported ADR issues collected from 
CVM, as well as measures of export orientation (exports/production) and imported inputs at 
industry level obtained at the FUNCEX. 
In Table 1 we report the number of observations in the sample per year and the annual 
descriptive statistics for the variables (and its interactions) under estimation. The sample size 
changes through the years as new firms are listed and incorporated in the dataset and bankrupt 
firms are not removed from the sample. We drop observations that have an absolute value of the 
z-score (calculated with the variable mean and standard deviation) greater than three. 
Our main dependent variables are Investment, measured as the change in net property and 
equipment
2, Total Sales and Cash Flow. During the estimation procedure, all firm variables were 
calculated as ratios to capital stock measured as the net property and equipment at the beginning 
of the year. In the appendix we describe all the variables used in detail.  
 
3. Macroeconomic Environment and Balance Sheet Structure 
 
In this section we study how the macroeconomic environment affected the balance sheet 
structure in Brazil. We start by describing those changes in the first subsection. We then 
investigate empirically the determinants of firms’ liability structure, in the subsequent subsection. 
 
3.1 Recent Macroeconomic Reforms in Brazil 
 
The reforms in Brazil changed substantially the macroeconomic environment. This should 
affect incentives involving firms’ decisions about how to finance their activities, and specially 
investment. As the equity market in Brazil remained in the whole period as a marginal source of 
funds, the sources of funds for investment were either retained profits or debt. Given the high 
level of interest rates, and the scarcity of long-term loans caused by the macroeconomic 
instability, the internal source was presumably very important, specially before the stabilization. 
As for the determinants of debt denomination and maturity, the availability of external sources, 
the uncertainty about future exchange rates, interest rates, and inflation, all should affect the ratio 
of dollar-debt and long-term debt.  
In the early nineties tariffs were substantially reduced, with average nominal tariff plunging 
from 39.6% in 1988 to 11.2% in 1994. Trade liberalization should make firm performance more 
sensitive to exchange rate  – competitive effect becomes more important. There was also an 
                                                  
1 Quarterly accounting numbers and monthly market variables are available and used in the 
construction of some variables. 
 
2 We used the price index of investment available in the PWT (Penn World Table) to deflate investment.   5 
important financial liberalization that gave firms more access to foreign assets and liabilities. 
Financial liberalization should make financial flows more sensitive to both interest and exchange 
rates. However, macroeconomic instability was still responsible for a reduced supply of foreign 
and domestic long-term credit. 
In 1994, the Real plan succeeded in finishing the chronic inflation process. Brazil has had one 
of the world’s longest high inflation processes. Long-term debt and financial assets practically 
disappeared, and even shorter-term financial instruments became indexed to the inflation rate or 
to the daily interest rate. Firms’ financial structure changed accordingly due to both new 
incentives provided by the low inflation environment, and to new financial regulation, which 
outlawed indexation on short-run contracts. Inflation stabilization increased debt maturity and 
reduced indexation. When uncertainty about the sustainability of the crawling-peg exchange rate 
regime increased, firms started to hedge against the exchange rate devaluation risk.  
In January 1999, exchange rate has been allowed to float. As a result exchange rate became 
much more volatile and interest rate became less volatile. This was coupled with an inflation-
targeting regime. 
In this environment firms would have more incentive to bear interest rate risk and to hedge 
exchange rate risk. On the other hand, with the free-floating regime, the risk of adoption of 
capital controls was reduced, what stimulated further the supply of foreign credit.  
An important issue is that the balance sheet effects should depend on how firms hedge their 
debt. Some firms may hedge totally their dollar debt, while others hedge only partially or do not 
hedge at all (see for example a news report - O Globo, 06/23/2002). This will affect substantially 
the way the amount of dollar debt influences the effect of devaluation at firm level, since only the 
amount that is not hedged should be relevant. In Brazil, firms have often hedged their dollar 
liabilities against exchange rate fluctuations and there are several instruments for that available in 
the Brazilian economy, such as exchange rate futures contracts, dollar indexed government 
bonds, swaps, dollar currency, foreign assets, etc. In the recent period, a frequent hedging 
mechanism for firms is to buy swaps between dollar-indexed payments and interests in domestic 
currency from banks. This mechanism is preferred because banks make tailor-made contracts 
according to the firm necessity. Banks do not run exchange rate risk because they can buy dollar 
indexed government bonds. Thus, in net terms, government provided hedge to firms, with banks’ 
intermediation. 
 
3.2 Analysis of the debt composition 
 
In this section we investigate the determinants of debt composition, paying special attention 
to the macroeconomic environment. First, we digress about the factors that should affect the debt 
composition. Then, we test some of our hypothesis. 
 
3.2.1  Considerations about the determinants of debt composition 
 
With imperfect capital markets, supply of funds can be as important determinant of the debt 
composition as demand. In particular the availability of external funds would depend on the 
liquidity of the international capital markets and on the international assessment of the country   6 
risk. Thus, the foreign supply of external debt was a very important determinant of the dollar 
debt.  
The same was true about the domestic long-run debt.  In Brazil, because of the 
macroeconomic instability there is no private supply of long-run debt for investment. The main 
provider of long-term loans is the Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES). The interest 
rates charged on those loans is much more stable than the market rates.  
As for the demand of loans, one could think in a natural segmentation between short-term and 
long-term depending on its use. First one should try to match the maturities in order to reduce 
risk. Thus, if it is long-term investment, one should try to get long-term loans with fixed real 
interest rates because this would reduce its risk. If it is for working capital, one should get short-
term loans. Although considerations of risk lead to a natural segmentation, important differences 
in costs or shortage of the desired type of loan could lead to mismatch.  
The external funds are presumably more risky because of the exchange rate variation. The 
incentive to borrow in external currency would come either from the unavailability of domestic 
funds, as often happens for long-run loans, or from its lower cost. Even in this case, the use of the 
loan should play a role. External loans are less risky if it is for investment in export activities. It 
is also attractive if it is used to import inputs, since those have their prices set in dollars. Other 
consideration that should matter is the firm’s ownership. An external loan is less risky in the 
perspective of a foreign share holder, since she has presumably other assets in dollars. Thus, a 
foreign loan should be more attractive for a foreign owned firm. 
Finally, given the high level of interest rates, and the scarcity of long-term loans caused by 
the macroeconomic instability, the firms’ i nternal savings was presumably a very important 
source of funds for investment, especially before the stabilization.  
 
3.2.2  Empirical analysis of the debt composition 
 
In Table 3 we show the evolution of the debt structure of firms in our sample. The proportion 
of debt in total assets increased in the sample period from 16.6% in 1990 to 21.8% in 2001, 
indicating that there was a reduction in financial repression during the period. The proportion of 
long-term debt also increased from 37.7 to 46.8%, in the same period. The substantial structural 
reduction in inflation and financial openness should have contributed for both increases. Those 
factors also led to a large increase of dollar-debt participation, from 37.7% in 1993 to 62.0% in 
2001. The participation of foreign currency increased in both short and long-term debt. The 
proportion of long-term debt also increased both in the local currency and dollar debt. Thus, it is 
clear in the data that the lengthening of debt maturities and debt internationalization were a 
marked feature of the last decade. 
In order to investigate the factors determining such changes, we estimate equations for the 
ratio of long-term debt D LT over total debt D T, and of dollar-debt D FC over total debt. We 
estimated the following equation: 
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where  it r  is a debt ratio,  t m ’s are variables capturing the macroeconomic environment and  it f ’s 
are firms’ individual features.  We also ran a dynamic version of this model, including the lagged 
dependent variable.    7 
Alternatively we ran a TOBIT version with the dependent variable being the ratios in levels.  
Naturally, because the ratios are always between 0 and 1, the truncation values where 0 and 1. 
The TOBIT model is an appealing specification when the range bounds have a relatively large 
proportion of observations. We checked that this is the case in our sample for the ratio variables. 
Table 4 reports the results for the ratio of long-term debt. We start by running OLS 
regressions with cluster-adjusted standard errors. First we use dummies for the subperiods we 
chose as a way of capturing the difference in macroeconomic environment. Since the sample goes 
from 1990 to 2001, the coefficients of 90-94 and 99-01 subperiod dummies represent the 
difference effect on the participation of long-term loans. There is a statistically significant 
increase in the proportion of long-term loans in the last subperiod, which corresponds to the free-
floating inflation targeting regime.   
Then, we use macroeconomic volatilities in the place of subperiod dummies. The volatility of 
interest rates affects more substantially firms with large proportion of short-term debt. Thus, a 
higher volatility of interest rates should induce an increase in the proportion of long-term debt. 
On the other hand inflation volatility should affect more firms with higher proportion of long-
term debt. As a consequence, an increase of inflation volatility should decrease the proportion of 
long-term debt. Those results verified in OLS regressions we ran, in the second column. The 
coefficients have the right sign and are statistically significant at 1%. Additionally, factors that 
affect the demand for foreign loans should also affect the demand for long-term debt, since the 
market for domestic long-term debt is very small. Then the volatilities of real exchange rate and 
the volatility of the change of real interest rate are included. A higher volatility of the real 
exchange rate is associated with the free-floating regime, which has a lower frontier risk, which 
should have a positive influence on the supply of foreign loans. The real devaluation of the 
exchange rate is a component of the real cost of dollar-debt, and its higher volatility should affect 
the demand side negatively. The coefficients of those volatilities have the right sign but only the 
coefficient of the volatility of the real exchange rate is statistically significant at 10%. The 
individual features we use as explanatory variables are size, as measured by the total assets, a 
dummy indicating if the firm has issued American Depositary Receipts (ADR), a dummy for 
tradable activity, and a dummy for foreign ownership. The results indicate that larger firms and 
firms that had issued ADR’s have a higher proportion of long-term debt (both significant at 1%), 
which was the expected result. Firms performing tradable activities have lower proportion of 
long-term asset (significant at 1%), and foreign ownership does not seem to influence the debt 
maturity. When try to capture the macroeconomic effects through the use of year dummies, the 
firm specific effects are unchanged. The values of the time dummies suggest a different 
classification of periods: a first period with relatively higher proportion of long-term loans before 
the stabilization  (1990-1993), a second period with relatively lower proportion of long-term 
loans (1994-1996) and a latter period with a recovery of the proportion of long-term loans (1997-
2001). When we run within groups’ regression to take care of possible fixed effects (in column 
3), all macroeconomic volatility coefficients cease from being statistically different from zero. 
Then, we experiment with a dynamic specification by including the dependent variable 
lagged once as an explanatory variable. The coefficient of the lagged dependent value is around 
0.4 in all estimations and highly significant. We use GMM difference and system estimators. 
First we use the period dummies specification. The sign of the recent period dummy changed, but 
became statistically insignificant. Then, we experimented using year dummies, instead of the 
period dummies. An increasing pattern results from the system estimator, while the difference 
GMM estimates for the dummies coefficients increase until 1997 and decrease afterwards. The 
size variable became insignificant.   8 
Finally we use a Tobit model on the ratio starting by the specification which has the period 
dummies and the individual features. The period dummies are both positive and significant, 
indicating that a relatively higher proportion of long-term for the first and last subperiods. The 
results for the coefficient of individual characteristics are similar to those obtained in the OLS 
model. 
We perform the same regressions changing the dependent variable for proportion of foreign 
debt. The results are presented in Table 5. The subperiod dummies are significantly negative for 
the first subperiod and positive for the second. This indicates that the macroeconomic 
environment improved from the first subperiod to the second, and from the second subperiod to 
the third. This should reflect the reduction in risk assessed by the foreign credit suppliers first 
when inflation was stabilized, and then when the floating exchange-rate/inflation-targeting 
regime was adopted. We then use  macro volatilities to further assess the impact of the 
macroeconomic environment. A higher volatility of inflation is again associated with a lower 
proportion of foreign debt. This result can be rationalized only if we consider that the amount of 
foreign d ebt is determined mainly by the supply side. Thus, as the volatility of inflation is 
associated with larger macroeconomic instability, the supply of foreign credit to Brazil is 
increased when inflation becomes less volatile. The proportion of dollar debt is again positively 
related to the volatility of real exchange rate, what can be justified by the effect of the lower 
frontier risk associated with the floating exchange rate regime affecting the supply of credit. It is 
also negatively related to the volatility of the real devaluation of the exchange rate, which affects 
the debtor risk and reduces its demand. As expected, the fact that the firm had issued an ADR 
affects positively the proportion of foreign debt, what is probably a supply side effect. The 
volatility of interest rate is insignificant. The variables size, and the tradable and foreign 
ownership dummies are all statistically insignificant. The within-group estimation does not 
change the results. When we use year dummies, the results are unchanged. The estimated 
coefficients are higher for more recent years.   
When we use the dynamic specification, the lagged variable is not statistically significant. 
Thus, it is not surprising that the results for the subperiod dummies are kept.  When we use year 
dummies the results for the GMM system are in line with those obtained in the OLS regressions.  
When we use the Tobit model, the volatily and alternatively the subperiod dummies estimates 
are qualitatively similar. The main change is that the size and tradable variable becomes negative 
and significantly different from zero, which was not predictable.  The pattern of the time 
dummies is a bit changed, but the main trait is maintained; that is, more recent coefficients tend 
to be larger. 
  On the whole the results for the share of foreign currency loans are more robust than the 
ones for the share of long-term loans. 
 
4. Debt Composition and Balance Sheet Effects of Interest Rate and Exchange Rate  
Bleakley and Cowan (2002) found that the balance sheet effect of exchange rate devaluation 
has a sign different than expected in a sample where more than half of observations were due to 
Brazilian firms. We intend to investigate this result by running different specifications of the 
investment equation. However, we start by running again the same regressions in a sample 
containing only Brazilian firms in order to see if their results are reproduced.   9 
4.1 Bleakley and Cowan regressions 
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where  it I is the firm’s investment. 
We report our results in Table 6. We run OLS and within-group regressions. We find the 
expected negative sign for the interaction effect for most specifications, capturing a negative 
balance sheet effect of devaluation. Moreover this effect becomes statistically significant at 1% 
level in the within-groups regression. When we add the interaction of exchange rate devaluation 
with sector imports and exports, that main effect continues significant at 1% level. The direct 
effect of the real exchange rate devaluation is itself positive and statistically significant for all 
four regressions.  Our total debt effect is negative as theirs, but, it is significant only in the 
within-gorup regression for the specification that includes interaction with exports and imports. 
The dollar-debt direct effect is positive and statistically significant (at least at 10%), as Bleakley 
and Cowan found. The interaction effect of imports has the expected negative sign,  but is not 
statistically significant. The one with exports has the same negative sign, and has even higher p -
values. 
  We also experiment with a dynamic version of Bleakley and Cowan’s specification by 
adding the lagged investment as one of the explanatory  variables. First we estimate by OLS, 
within-groups, GMM-difference and GMM-system regressions the basic equation without 
interaction with exports and imports. The coefficients of the lagged dependent variable in OLS 
and within-group estimation are negative, small, statistically significant, and almost identical. 
This same coefficient has the same value at the GMM system estimation but has slightly larger 
value for the GMM difference estimation. In fact, the GMM system results are almost identical to 
the ones generated by the within-groups estimation method. However, none of the GMM’s pass 
the Sargan test. When we add exports and imports, the external debt becomes negative (and 
significant for the GMM difference method), the domestic debt positive (and statistically 
significant at 10%). But the GMM system estimates for the exchange rate interaction with the 
dollar debt, and with imports continue to be negative and statistically significant (the former at 
5% and the latter at 10%).  In the GMM difference results the interaction term changes sign for 
dollar debt and ceases to be statistically significant in both cases. However, only the GMM 
difference estimation for this specification passes the Sargan test. We have in the appendix the 
same regressions having sales as a dependent variable (see Table A.1). The results change 
completely and none of the variables is significantly different from zero. 
It is possible to speculate why our results are different from those of Bleakley and Cowan. 
First, our sample is different from theirs, since it contains only Brazilian firms and three more 
years of data (1990, 2000 and 2001). Second, our variables are normalized by capital stock (K), 
what makes them stationary. Third, we used within-group estimators to take into account firm 
specific effects, since in this case OLS estimators are biased upwards. 
   10 
4.2 An alternative investment specification 
 
Bleakley and Cowan’s specification are subject to some criticism. Although the exchange rate 
variable related to the balance sheet effect should be the real exchange rate devaluation, the 
competitiveness effect should influence investment through the level of multilateral real 
exchange rate. However, the multilateral exchange rate is highly correlated with the real 
exchange rate
3. Hence, what matters most in the remark we made is the difference between level 
and devaluation rate. Thus, not only their results are reverted in our estimation, but also their 
interpretation of their positive interaction sign is questionable, since they attribute  it to the 
prevalence of the substitution effect.  
The balance-sheet effect should affect firms’ investment when market imperfections create a 
wedge between the cost of internal and external finance. With perfect capital markets investment 
is determined only by its prospective rate of return compared with its financial opportunity cost. 
When capital markets are imperfect firms it becomes cheaper to use internal sources to invest 
and the wedge between internal and external cost of finance may depend on the value of their 
collateral. In extreme conditions, internal finance may be the only source of funds for investing. 
As a result of imperfect capital markets, investment becomes sensitive to variables representing 
the financial condition of the firm, as cash flow and net worth. We start by testing the 
sensitiveness of investment to cash flow. Since the cash flow should be affected by the exchange 
rate balance sheet effect and by the interest rate balance sheet effect, and in this first specification 
we decided not to include those variables. We estimate the following dynamic specification for 
investment 
it it t i it t e it c it i it it I e E e CF r I c I e a a a a + + + + + + = - - 1 1  
where  it r  is the firm’s financial cost,  it CF the cash flow,  t e the multilateral real exchange rate. 
In this specification,  it r  intends to capture the firm’s opportunity or financial cost, the 
multilateral exchange rate influences its profitability through the substitution effect interacting 
with exports or imports, and the cash flow captures market imperfection.  
Table 7 reports the results with the macroeconomic environment being captured alternatively 
by the period dummies or by the year dummies. The cash flow has the expected positive sign in 
the GMM specifications, becoming significant at 10% in the GMM difference estimation. None 
of the other coefficients of firm variables were statistically significant. The user cost, the imports 
and exports interactions coefficients alternate signs. When we added the cash flow lagged twice, 
following Ferrua and Meneses (2002), we reduce the p-value of the cash-flow lagged once, while 
also obtaining a positive coefficient for the cash flow lagged twice. In this specification, the user 
cost’s coefficient in the GMM estimations become negative, although not yet significant. Thus 
this equation suggests that capital markets are imperfect in Brazil.  The estimated coefficient for 
the lagged dependent variable satisfy Bond’s rule of thumb according to which it should be 
between the OLS and the within-group estimate only for the GMM system specification. 
We experiment with interactions between cash flow and exchange rate devaluation in Table 
8. The coefficients for the two lags have opposite signs. Then, we test if the interaction between 
the dollar debt and real exchange rate devaluation depends on firm’s cash flow. One would 
expect that firms with lower cash flow should have stronger negative effect of devaluation.  Then 
we would expect a positive sign for the interaction coefficient. However, we found a negative 
sign, although non-significant. 
                                                  
3The correlation between the two real exchange rates was 0,911 for the period under study.   11 
In Table 9 we test directly the exchange rate and interest rate balance sheet effects. We use 
year dummies to control for macroeconomic effects. Instead of including cash flow as an 
explanatory variable, we include the interactions between real exchange rate depreciation and 
dollar debt and between (log of) real interest rate and debt in local currency. The real exchange 
rate depreciation interaction has the expected negative sign in all specifications other than the 
OLS, but it is not significant. The interest rate interaction sign depends on the equation, although 
it is always not significant. We experiment with a proxy for the cost of external debt, by 
summing the US Treasury bond rate, the Brazilian risk to the real devaluation rate. We interact 
the dollar debt with this proxy, instead of interacting it with the real devaluation rate. The results 
do not change. Again, the estimated coefficient for the lagged dependent variable satisfy Bond’s 
rule of thumb only for the GMM system specification. 
In Table 10 we test for non-linear exchange rate balance sheet effect by adding an interaction 
between the dollar debt and square of the exchange rate real devaluation. In the GMM estimation 
the signs of this term are negative, indicating that an exchange rate devaluation has a larger 
contractionary effect on investment than the expansionary effect of an equivalent exchange rate 
appreciation.  However, while the linear term interaction term has the expected negative sign and 
is statistically significant in the GMM system estimation, the quadratic term is never significant. 
Since the balance sheet effect should be more important for short-run debt, we estimate an 
investment equation where the interaction terms are split between short and long-term debts 
(Table 11). Thus, we found, using the GMM-system estimation method, that interactions 
involving short-term local and foreign currency debt and long-term local currency debt are all 
always negative. Furthermore, the short-term foreign currency and the long-term local currency 
interaction terms tend to be significant in most specifications. Thus, only the long-term foreign 
currency term alternates signs. This could be explained because mainly financially strong firms 
should have access to long-term foreign capital markets. And those firms should be the less 
vulnerable to the balance sheet effect of exchange rate devaluation. The results change for the 
GMM difference, but the GMM system estimates are the only ones that satisfy Bond’s rule of 
thumb.  We conclude that some further evidence is found for the balance sheet in this more 
detailed specification. 
Finally, we investigate the relation between the exchange and interest rates balance sheet 
effects and cash flows. In Tables 12 and 13 we have a dynamic specification with two lags for 
firms’ cash flows. We investigate how the interaction terms relate to cash flows. In Table 10 the 
debt is split only in local currency and dollar debt. The dollar debt interaction coefficients are 
always negative and statistically significant in the GMM system estimations. The local debt 
interaction term alternates signs. When we further subdivide the each debt denomination in short 
and long-term, the results worsen. Although almost all interaction terms tend to be significant, 
the only negative coefficient is that of the interaction between long-term debt and real exchange 
rate depreciation. 
 
4.3 Were the effects modified by the structural changes in Brazilian economy? 
 
The main question in this subsection is if the effects of exchange rate and interest rates were 
affected by two important macroeconomic reforms: the Real Plan, in 1994, and the change in 
exchange rate and monetary regime, in 1999. The other question is if the model fitness improves 
if we assume different coefficients for the subperiod. For that we take the period of 1995 to 1998   12 
as our basis period and use dummies for the high inflation (1990-1994) and floating exchange 
rate (1999-2001) subperiods interacting with the explanatory variables.  
Table 14 presents the results for the investment equations, which include cash flow as 
explanatory variable. Cash flow was more important to explain investment in the 1990-1994 and 
1999-2001 periods, since the interaction between the cash flow variable with those periods 
dummies tend to be positive.  
In Table 15 we investigate how exchange rate and interest rate balance sheet effects change in 
each subperiod. We report the specification with firm level controls
4. If there is a negative 
balance sheet effect of exchange depreciation, this could be captured only for the last subperiod. 
The coefficient of the exchange rate interaction term without dummy, which corresponds to the 
1995-1998 subperiod, is positive and statistically significant for the GMM system estimation. 
The coefficient of the interaction term multiplied by the 1999-2001 dummy variable is negative 
and with larger magnitude than that of the base period, and statistically significant when firm 
level controls are used.  Interestingly, the coefficient for the basis period for the interaction 
between local currency debt and interest rates is also positive, but the interaction with the dummy 
for the most recent period is negative and with a larger magnitude than that, although none of 
them are statistically significant. However, there is strong evidence for the interest balance sheet 
effect in the first subperiod, which is consistent with view that capital markets were less 
developed in this subperiod. 
When we try to investigate more specific effects of interaction of short and long-term debt 
(Table 16), we don’t find a clear pattern in the results, possibly because there is overfitting due to 
the excess of explanatory variables. 
 
4.4 Can we capture the effect of hedge? 
 
Since it is plausibly argued that the balance sheet effect is not as strong because an important 
part of firms are hedged against exchange rate variations, we decided to investigate the issue by 
constructing a hedge variable
5. We calculate for each year and for each firm which holds dollar 
debt, the correlation between the financial income (normalized by capital stock) and the variation 
in the real exchange rate depreciation. When the firm is not hedged, this covariance should be 
negative, but when it is hedged this covariance should be close to zero. We set the dummy to 1 
(not hedged) whenever the correlation was smaller than –0.2.  
The coefficient of the interaction variable multiplied by the hedge should be negative, since 
this represents the additional effect in firms that are not hedged. However, we found that this 
coefficient is positive and statistically significant at 1% level (Table 17), meaning that the 
“unhedged” firms are the ones responsible for the exchange rate balance sheet effect. We perform 
a further test in our hedge variable by testing the same specification with cash flow as a 




                                                  
4 The other specifications generated several implausibly large coefficient estimates, which seems to be an evidence 
of multicolinearity. Those results are reported in the appendix. 
5 The value of firms’ hedge is not directly available from our sources. The proportion of dollar debt hedged is sometimes reported in a note under 
the published balance sheet, what makes difficult to adopt a general procedure for collecting this information.   13 
5. Conclusion 
We used firm level data to investigate balance sheet effects of exchange rate and interest rates 
in the Brazilian economy. There is some evidence of a balance sheet effect of exchange rate 
depreciation, contrary to what was found by Bleakey and Cowan (2002). This evidence is 
consistent with the imperfection of capital markets, which makes investment positively related to 
cash flows. The evidence of exchange rate balance sheet effect is concentrated mainly in the 
1999-2001 subperiod, while the evidence for the interest balance sheet effect is concentrated in 
the first subperiod. 
We can speculate about the reasons for a weak exchange rate balance sheet effect taking into 
account the difference of results in subperiods, and the recent macroeconomic history in Brazil. 
Before 1994, when inflation was high, capital markets were less developed. Then, the potential 
for balance sheet effects was high. However, external financial intermediation was low due to 
high inflation, and exchange rates were following a stable crawling peg.  From 1995 to 1998, 
financial intermediation increased but again there was no sizeable variation in the real exchange 
rate.  From 1999 to 2001, exchange rates were floating, and our subperiod analysis suggests that 
the negative effect comes to that part of the sample. In fact, this helps to explain the difference 
between our results and those of Bleakley and Cowan (2002). We have two years more of data in 
that subperiod, when the number of firms were also higher than average.  
As for the interest rate balance sheet effect, volatility of real interest rate was much higher in 
the first subperiod, decreasing substantial after that, as shown in Figure 1. Before the inflation 
stabilization, there was also little supply of external loans and long-term domestic loans. As a 
consequence the proportion of short-term local currency debt was at its peak, decreasing steadily 
afterwards, as shown in Table 3. Those factors taken together contributed for an important 
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Appendix - Variables description 
In this section we present the description of the variables used throughout the study. 
 
Country-level variables 
The sources of macroeconomic data are: Brazilian Central Bank, IPEA database, FUNCEX 
(Center of International Commerce Studies) web site and IFS system. 
 
 
Nominal interest rate 
Is the rate on loans issued by the financial sector. Corresponds to the selic rate on 30 days 
(source: Central Bank of Brazil). 
 
Real interest rate 
Corresponds to the nominal interest rate adjusted by the inflation price index variation over the 
same time period. 
 
Nominal exchange rate 
Is the ratio between Real and US dollars, collected monthly, end of period (source: Central Bank 
of Brazil). 
 
Real exchange rate 
Corresponds to the nominal exchange rate adjusted by the inflation price index. 
 
Multilateral real exchange rate 
Corresponds to the relative cost of a common basket of goods measured in terms of a common 




















in which e corresponds to the nominal exchange rate between the countries and WPI corresponds 
to the wholesale price index. The multilateral real exchange rate is than an average of those 
bilateral exchange rates weighted by Brazilian international trade weights (FUNCEX). 
 
Inflation (IPCA) 
A broad consumer price index, collected monthly. This index was used to deflate all variables in 
the study except investment. During the estimation procedure, we accumulated the monthly 
variation to construct the annual series (source: IBGE). 
 
 
Price Level on Investment 
An investment p rice index used to deflate the investment variable. It is available in the Penn 
World Table (source: Penn Data homepage). 
 
Exports orientation (Exp)   16 
Corresponds to the ratio of exports to production, calculated annually at industry level. (source: 
FUNCEX homepage). 
 
Imported inputs (Imp) 
Corresponds to the proportion of imported inputs, calculated annually at industry level (source: 
FUNCEX homepage). 
 
Current Account (%GDP) 
Corresponds to the current account in the Balance of Payments (source: IFS).  
 
Capital Inflow (%GDP) 
Is a measure of net capital inflows, corresponding to the financial account in the Balance of 
Payments (source: IFS). 
 
Bank Credit (%GDP) 
Is a measure of credit to the private sector and corresponds to the account claims on the private 
sector held by deposit banks (source: IFS). 
 
Inflow of Credit (%GDP) 
Is a measure of inflow of credit to private firms and corresponds to the sum of the following 
accounts: debt securities liabilities and other investment liabilities to other sectors (source: IFS). 
 
Country Risk 
Our measure of Brazilian sovereign risk is the Spread over Treasury of the C-Bond (Brazilian 
Capitalization Bond), the most liquid Brazilian bond. It was issued in January, 1995 and matures 
in April, 2014.  
 
 
Country-level constructed variables 
 
Real interest rate volatility - s(ln(1+r)) 
It is the volatility of the log of the real interest rate, accumulated during the year. 
 
Inflation price index variation volatility - s (IPCA) 
It is the volatility of the broad consumer price index annual variation. 
 
Real exchange rate volatility - s (lnRER)  
It is the volatility of the log of the real exchange rate. 
 
Real exchange rate variation volatility - s (DlnRER)  
It is the volatility of the log of the real exchange rate annual variation.   17 
Firm-level variables 
The source of all firm-level variables used in the paper is Economática system. 
 
 
Sales to Capital Stock ratio 
It is a measure of total sales during the year to capital stock at the beginning of the year. The 
capital stock variable corresponds to the account net property and equipment. 
 
Investment to Capital Stock ratio 
It is a measure of the change in capital stock during the year to the capital stock at the beginning 
of the year, adjusted by the price level of investment. 
 
Cash Flow to Capital Stock ratio 
Corresponds to the Net Income account accumulated during the year to the capital stock at the 
beginning of the year. 
 
Debt in Foreign Currency to Total Debt ratio 
It is a measure of the stock of debt denominated in foreign currency converted into local currency 
(using the exchange rate for the period in which the balance sheet is reported) to the total debt at 
the end of the year. 
 
Long Term Debt to Total Debt ratio 
It is a measure of the stock of long-term debt to the total debt at the end of the year. 
 
Total Debt to Capital Stock ratio 
It is a measure of the total debt at the end of the year to the capital stock at the beginning of the 
year. 
 
Short Term Debt to Capital Stock ratio 
It is a measure of the short-term debt at the end of the year to the capital stock at the beginning of 
the year. 
 
Long Term Debt to Capital Stock ratio 
It is a measure of the long-term debt at the end of the year to the capital stock at the beginning of 
the year. 
 
Debt in Foreign Currency to Capital Stock ratio 
It is a measure of the stock of debt denominated in foreign currency converted into local currency 
(using the exchange rate for the period in which the balance sheet is reported) to the capital stock 
at the beginning of the year. 
 
Debt in Local Currency to Capital Stock ratio 
It is a measure of the stock of debt calculated in Reais to the capital stock at the beginning of the 
year. 
 
Short Term Debt in Foreign Currency to Capital Stock ratio   18 
It is a measure of the stock of short-term debt denominated in foreign currency converted into 
local currency (using the exchange rate for the period in which the balance sheet is reported) to 
the capital stock at the beginning of the year. 
 
Short Term Debt in Local Currency to Capital Stock ratio 
It is a measure of the stock of short-term debt calculated in Reais to  the capital stock at the 
beginning of the year. 
 
Long Term Debt in Foreign Currency to Capital Stock ratio 
It is a measure of the stock of long-term debt denominated in foreign currency converted into 
local currency (using the exchange rate for the period in which the balance sheet is reported) to 
the capital stock at the beginning of the year. 
 
Long Term Debt in Local Currency to Capital Stock ratio 
It is a measure of the stock of long-term debt calculated in Reais to the capital stock at the 
beginning of the year. 
 
Financial Expenses to Capital Stock ratio 
It is a measure of financial expenses accumulated during the year to the capital stock at the 
beginning of the year. 
 
Tobin’Q 
It is a measure of the firms’ profitability constructed as the market value of assets divided by its 
the replacement cost. The numerator is the book value of assets minus the book value of common 
equity and deferred taxes plus the market value of common equity. The denominator is the book 






Economática industry classification 
Classifies the firm according to its main activities. Economática has up to 18 different industries. 
 
Ownership structure 




It is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the firm is in a tradable industry 
(agriculture, food & beverage, manufacturing, mining, pulp & paper, oil & gas, chemical, vehicle 
& parts, transportation services - Source: Economática). 
 
ADR issued 
It is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the firm has issued an ADR in the US 
market (Source: CVM). 
   19 
Size 
Corresponds to a tercile ranking classification for the firms, changeable every year, based on the 
total assets reported in the balance sheet. The firm takes on a value of one if it’s a small company, 
two if it’s medium and three if it’s large (Source: Economática). 
 Table 1
Period 1995 to 1998 1999 to 2001
Real exchange rate 2.79% 17.95%
Real interest rate 2.29% 1.71%













































































N. OBS MEAN STDEV
year
Country level data
Dln(RER) 12 (0.025) 0.170
ln(1+r) 12 0.134 0.145
MultRER 12 0.798 0.131
s (lnRER) 12 0.053 0.047
s (DlnRER) 12 0.042 0.046
s (ln(1+r)) 12 0.020 0.027
s (IPCA) 12 0.060 0.089
Firm level data
year x firm
Sales/K 2493 2,916.27 38,738.18
I/K 3020 0.492 8.283
CF/K 2085 0.086 3.639
DFC/DT 490 0.537 0.324
DLT/DT 2835 0.417 0.309
DT/K 2696 40.281 1117.554
DST/K  2664 12.941 292.281
DLT/K  2664 27.797 1026.798
DFC/K 462 3.271 17.663
DLC/K 599 93.036 2218.973
DST_FC/K  350 1.520 10.699
DST_LC/K  491 6.359 97.657
DLT_FC/K  357 2.742 14.574
DLT_LC/K  495 106.275 2345.145
Financial Expenses / K 2582 4.476 93.837
Tobin's Q 2526 (1.975) 23.228
Macro & firm level data interactions
DFC/K -1* Dln(RER)  383 0.230 1.389
DFC/K -1* Dln(RER)
 2 383 0.051 0.286
DFC/K -1* [Dln(RER) + UST + Country Risk ] 357 0.628 3.089
DLC/K -1* ln(1+r)  497 18.881 415.386
DST_FC/K -1* Dln(RER)  288 0.091 0.602
DST_LC/K -1* ln(1+r)  400 1.102 18.229
DLT_FC/K -1* Dln(RER)  293 0.211 1.264
DLT_LC/K -1* ln(1+r)  411 21.760 438.853
CF/K -1* Dln(RER)  1828 0.005 0.351
Observations considered outliers were removed from the sample (values greater than 3 standard deviations)
Pooled data from Economática and Government sources covering all publicly traded companies during the period under study.
 Panel B: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Number of firms in sample per year
Table 2 -  Sample Statistics1990 16.59% 62.31% 37.69% - -
1991 12.70% 64.27% 35.73% - -
1992 13.82% 60.33% 39.67% - -
1993 16.52% 61.25% 38.75% 37.69% 62.31%
1994 13.76% 60.67% 39.33% 36.46% 63.54%
1995 15.92% 63.00% 37.00% 39.68% 60.32%
1996 18.88% 59.16% 40.84% 33.05% 66.95%
1997 20.09% 54.44% 45.56% 50.03% 49.97%
1998 20.13% 56.29% 43.71% 65.05% 34.95%
1999 21.70% 55.46% 44.54% 62.07% 37.93%
2000 19.88% 53.34% 46.66% 62.75% 37.25%
2001 21.81% 53.25% 46.75% 62.03% 37.97%
1990 - - - -
1991 - - - -
1992 - - - -
1993 29.53% 25.37% 51.83% 32.70%
1994 38.22% 22.27% 42.15% 36.28%
1995 27.56% 34.31% 46.29% 34.95%
1996 31.53% 21.37% 41.24% 31.03%
1997 34.94% 35.25% 27.98% 32.64%
1998 37.05% 41.96% 29.53% 31.21%
1999 28.93% 44.05% 33.47% 32.59%
2000 32.36% 44.91% 28.87% 34.91%
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CurrencyTable 4 - Estimation of Debt Maturity Composition








DLT/ DT (-1) 0.446 0.424 0.446 0.388
[0] [0] [0] [0]
s s s s_lnRER (-1) 3.660 1.748 1.097
[0.091] [0.425] [0.001]
s_D s_D s_D s_DlnRER (-1) -0.133 0.070 -0.321
[0.903] [0.952] [0.087]
s s s s_lnRIR (-1) 12.095 4.207 4.360
[0.005] [0.221] [0]
s s s s_IPCA (-1) -3.940 -1.889 -1.120
[0.004] [0.126] [0]
Size 0.410 0.538 0.554 0.173 0.552 -0.015 1.759 -0.141 0.131 0.160 0.169
[0] [0] [0] [0.058] [0.569] [0.983] [0.201] [0.898] [0] [0] [0]
ADR 0.393 0.344 0.337 0.093 0.080 0.076
[0.004] [0.012] [0.016] [0.001] [0.004] [0.006]
Tradable -0.609 -0.588 -0.566 -0.068 -0.059 -0.057
[0] [0] [0] [0.021] [0.042] [0.051]
Foreign Ownership -0.157 -0.177 -0.179 -0.031 -0.037 -0.041
[0.632] [0.596] [0.597] [0.656] [0.598] [0.57]
Constant -0.710 -1.050 -0.553 -0.526 0.282 0.399 0.001 0.057 0.121 0.041 -0.004
[0.021] [0.006] [0.032] [0.03] [0.352] [0.829] [0.997] [0.969] [0.035] [0.534] [0.862]
Period Dummies
D 90_94 0.170 1.934 0.475 0.098
[0.236] [0.161] [0.632] [0]
D 99_01 0.214 -1.152 -0.007 0.033
[0.034] [0.257] [0.991] [0.088]
Year Dummies
D 1991 -0.106 0.037
[0.413] [0.253]
D 1992 0.073 0.129 -0.053
[0.701] [0.567] [0.161]
D 1993 -0.161 -1.009 0.187 -0.189
[0.404] [0.145] [0.662] [0]
D 1994 -0.730 -1.668 0.354 -0.238
[0.004] [0.246] [0.809] [0]
D 1995 -0.735 -0.366 0.244 -0.204
[0.004] [0.288] [0.872] [0]
D 1996 -0.712 -0.164 0.285 -0.156
[0.007] [0.547] [0.851] [0.001]
D 1997 -0.382 -0.011 0.573 -0.144
[0.138] [0.97] [0.713] [0.002]
D 1998 -0.341 -0.083 0.640 -0.149
[0.158] [0.747] [0.694] [0.002]
D 1999 -0.404 -0.014 0.560 -0.140
[0.107] [0.961] [0.737] [0.004]
D 2000 -0.236 -0.015 0.597 -0.161
[0.374] [0.95] [0.723] [0.001]
D 2001 -0.313 -0.301 0.471 0.211
[0.236] [0.263] [0.787] [0]
R - squared 9.0% 9.7% 10.2% 0.6%
N uncensored 1947 1947 1947 1947 1370 1639 1370 1639 1947 1947 1947
Left censored 316 316 316
F - statistic 14.750 12.150 6.840 1.920
[0] [0] [0] [0.087]
Likelihood Ratio 255.660 293.710 303.940
[0] [0] [0]
Wald (joint) 30.500 31.170 28.560 30.200
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Wald (time) 8.136 7.841
[0.616] [0.644]
AR(1) -5.194 -6.365 -5.647 -6.112
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
AR(2) -0.099 0.293 -0.001 0.197
[0.921] [0.770] [0.999] [0.844]
Sargan 20.670 50.520 25.400 57.980
[0.055] [0.000] [0.031] [0.000]
P-values are reported in brackets.
 c.a. OLS and Tobit p-values were adjusted for clustering.
We used the (ln(ratio/(1-ratio)) as the dependent variable in the estimations, except for the Tobit model.
GMM difference and system estimators use instruments lagged 2 and 3 periods.
GMM results are one step estimates with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and test statistics.
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, asymptotically N(0,1).
The Wald (joint) statistics tests the hypothesis that the coefficients are jointly zero.
yes yes yes yes
yes yes yes yes
yes yes yes yesTable 5 - Estimation of Debt Currency Composition








DFC / DT (-1) -0.302 -0.206 -0.389 -0.125
[0.332] [0.534] [0.126] [0.677]
s_lnRER (-1) 40.219 43.994 6.249
[0.015] [0.003] [0.034]
s_ _ _ _DlnRER (-1) -12.684 -13.364 -1.849
[0.04] [0.018] [0.103]
s_lnRIR (-1) 19.262 11.434 -3.170
[0.743] [0.843] [0.756]
s_IPCA (-1) -28.782 -30.572 -4.561
[0.005] [0.001] [0.012]
Size -0.008 0.097 0.088 -0.288 1.462 -1.771 -0.227 -2.450 -0.104 -0.087 -0.095
[0.972] [0.678] [0.718] [0.509] [0.603] [0.104] [0.92] [0.074] [0.001] [0.007] [0.003]
ADR 0.704 0.643 0.675 0.132 0.123 0.135
[0.065] [0.096] [0.077] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]
Tradable -0.178 -0.142 -0.145 -0.082 -0.078 -0.076
[0.606] [0.684] [0.675] [0.026] [0.034] [0.031]
Foreign Ownership -0.329 -0.451 -0.411 0.077 0.060 0.064
[0.61] [0.477] [0.536] [0.306] [0.431] [0.379]
Constant -0.275 -0.800 -0.266 0.242 -0.028 4.572 0.730 6.124 0.804 0.766 0.615
[0.687] [0.392] [0.75] [0.863] [0.9] [0.239] [0.119] [0.12] [0] [0] [0]
Period Dummies
D 90_94 -0.758 -1.582 -1.465 -0.176
[0.031] [0] [0] [0.002]
D 99_01 0.633 1.536 2.637 0.120
[0.008] [0.109] [0.076] [0.001]
Year Dummies
D 1994 -1.259 -0.012
[0.158] [0.922]
D 1995 -0.939 0.945 0.038
[0.233] [0.082] [0.76]
D 1996 -1.135 -0.417 1.035 -0.033
[0.203] [0.573] [0.03] [0.785]
D 1997 -0.109 0.467 0.656 0.129
[0.895] [0.442] [0.259] [0.282]
D 1998 0.401 0.737 1.931 0.321
[0.641] [0.389] [0.013] [0.005]
D 1999 0.374 -0.159 2.586 0.275
[0.674] [0.795] [0.006] [0.017]
D 2000 0.394 -0.523 2.660 0.293
[0.671] [0.351] [0.004] [0.011]
D 2001 0.321 -0.941 2.364 0.282
[0.731] [0.117] [0.007] [0.015]
R - squared 7.7% 7.9% 12.5% 9.5%
N uncensored 393 393 393 393 141 199 141 199 393 393 393
Right censored 48 48 48
F - statistic 2.770 3.170 3.880 5.510
[0.015] [0.003] [0] [0]
Likelihood Ratio 42.570 38.340 68.280
[0] [0] [0]
Wald (joint) 16.270 50.110 2.369 22.620
[0.023] [0.000] [0.796] [0.000]
Wald (time) 55.810 19.880
[0.000] [0.006]
AR(1) -2.116 -2.608 -1.877 -2.183
[0.034] [0.009] [0.061] [0.029]
AR(2) 1.619 1.288 1.471 1.588
[0.105] [0.198] [0.141] [0.112]
Sargan 14.910 8.822 11.610 11.940
[0.037] [0.921] [0.236] [0.850]
P-values are reported in brackets.
 c.a. OLS and Tobit p-values were adjusted for clustering.
We used the (ln(ratio/(1-ratio)) as the dependent variable in the estimations, except for the Tobit model.
GMM difference and system estimators use instruments lagged 2 and 3 periods.
GMM results are one step estimates with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and test statistics.
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, asymptotically N(0,1).
The Wald (joint) statistics tests the hypothesis that the coefficients are jointly zero.
yes yes yes yes
yes yes yes yes
yes yes yes yesDependent Variable:  I/K 
OLS WG OLS WG OLS WG GMM-Diff GMM-Sys GMM-Diff GMM-Sys
(I/K) -1 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.040 -0.017
[0] [0] [0] [0] [0.093] [0.041]
D D D Dln(RER) 0.643 0.684 1.253 1.401 0.640 0.680 0.645 0.909 1.076 1.477
[0] [0] [0] [0.023] [0] [0] [0.003] [0] [0.033] [0]
(DFC/K) -1 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.010 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.003 -0.189 -0.044
[0.047] [0.003] [0.722] [0.1] [0.049] [0.001] [0.675] [0] [0.051] [0.113]
(DT/K) -1 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.007 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.126 0.043
[0.52] [0.371] [0.948] [0.014] [0.828] [0.676] [0.376] [0.855] [0.098] [0.09]
(DFC/K) -1 * D D D Dln(RER) -0.016 -0.036 0.002 -0.045 -0.019 -0.032 -0.011 -0.036 0.030 -0.034
[0.167] [0.002] [0.93] [0.001] [0.083] [0.006] [0.316] [0] [0.615] [0.043]
Exp * D D D Dln(RER) -0.694 -0.270 0.282 -0.271
[0.13] [0.687] [0.757] [0.586]
Imp * D D D Dln(RER) -1.726 -2.664 -3.955 -2.827
[0.12] [0.224] [0.172] [0.078]
Constant -0.105 -0.108 -0.105 0.042 -0.111 0.064 -0.126
[0] [0] [0] [0.099] [0] [0.097] [0]
R - squared 7.6% 9.2% 10.1% 11.7% 8.7% 10.4%
N 380 325 266 225 380 325 234 325 162 225
Wald (joint) 39.060 24.520 43.480 25.620 459.700 300.400 60.190 449.200 46.470 278.900
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
AR(1) -0.191 -2.229 -0.457 -2.261 -0.372 -2.357 -1.825 -1.894 -2.575 -1.818
[0.849] [0.026] [0.648] [0.024] [0.710] [0.018] [0.068] [0.058] [0.010] [0.069]
AR(2) 0.088 -2.435 -0.479 -2.168 0.002 -2.527 0.634 0.662 -0.887 0.158
[0.930] [0.015] [0.632] [0.030] [0.999] [0.011] [0.526] [0.508] [0.375] [0.874]
Sargan Test 43.990 476.500 35.630 348.000
[0.061] [0.000] [0.887] [0.000]
P-values are reported in brackets.
GMM difference and system estimators use instruments lagged 2 and 3 periods.
GMM results are one step estimates with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and test statistics.
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, asymptotically N(0,1).
The Wald (joint) statistics tests the hypothesis that the coefficients are jointly zero.
Table 6 - Effects of Foreign Currency Debt and Interactions and Exchange Rate Movements on InvestmentTable7 - Effects of Cash Flow, Financial Expenses and Multilateral Exchange Rate on Investment
Dependent Variable:  I/K 
OLS WG GMM-Diff GMM-Sys GMM-Diff GMM-Sys OLS WG GMM-Diff GMM-Sys GMM-Diff GMM-Sys
(I/K) -1 -0.001 -0.047 -0.053 -0.043 -0.054 -0.044 -0.007 -0.277 -0.318 -0.122 -0.305 -0.124
[0.767] [0.316] [0.356] [0.319] [0.341] [0.314] [0.618] [0.007] [0.037] [0.057] [0.043] [0.053]
(CF/K) -1 -0.004 0.065 0.167 0.038 0.167 0.034 -0.015 0.018 0.206 0.054 0.195 0.052
[0.925] [0.097] [0.096] [0.115] [0.081] [0.153] [0.719] [0.413] [0.059] [0.107] [0.051] [0.105]
(CF/K) -2 0.027 0.203 0.307 0.127 0.289 0.131
[0.543] [0.277] [0.232] [0.232] [0.25] [0.254]
(Fin Exp/K) 0.002 0.002 -0.004 0.002 -0.005 0.002 0.001 0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.007 -0.004
[0.221] [0.025] [0.548] [0.458] [0.486] [0.66] [0.071] [0.065] [0.616] [0.711] [0.521] [0.568]
Exp * MultRER -0.067 -0.832 -0.770 0.252 0.021 0.415 -0.097 -0.733 1.043 0.231 0.188 0.156
[0.754] [0.293] [0.309] [0.488] [0.976] [0.426] [0.715] [0.498] [0.536] [0.568] [0.808] [0.7]
Imp * MultRER -1.573 -2.885 2.893 -1.488 3.575 -1.688 -1.652 -2.934 6.463 -2.094 4.408 -3.079
[0.145] [0.092] [0.151] [0.12] [0.057] [0.236] [0.167] [0.151] [0.135] [0.149] [0.057] [0.215]
Constant 1.309 -0.879 1.262 -0.201 0.076 0.363 -0.206 0.491 -0.065 0.247
[0] [0] [0] [0.007] [0.637] [0.088] [0.233] [0] [0.475] [0.308]
Period Dummies
D 90_94 -0.532 -0.097 0.052 -0.153
[0.006] [0.247] [0.873] [0.027]
D 99_01 0.395 0.381 -0.062 0.739
[0.313] [0.189] [0.896] [0.138]
Year Dummies
D 1992 -0.644 -1.146 -0.708
[0.028] [0] [0.006]
D 1993 -0.808 -1.242 0.389 -0.806 0.180 -1.268 0.127
[0] [0] [0.462] [0] [0.198] [0.057] [0.528]
D 1994 -1.702 -2.119 -0.044 -1.735 -0.727 -1.402 -0.578 -0.778
[0] [0] [0.899] [0] [0] [0] [0.023] [0]
D 1995 -1.247 -1.584 1.109 -1.305 -0.268 -1.129 -0.158 -0.519
[0] [0] [0] [0] [0.042] [0] [0.78] [0.001]
D 1996 -1.263 -1.530 1.066 -1.272 -0.306 -1.000 0.509 -0.537
[0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0.003] [0]
D 1997 -0.795 -1.094 1.310 -0.771 0.201 -0.454 0.788 0.138
[0.009] [0] [0] [0.031] [0.526] [0.055] [0.004] [0.735]
D 1998 -1.127 -1.417 0.500 -1.177 -0.173 -0.695 -0.216 -0.307
[0] [0] [0.214] [0] [0.005] [0] [0.588] [0]
D 1999 -0.316 -0.284 1.383 -0.486 0.733 0.397 -0.104 0.484
[0.567] [0.64] [0.005] [0.28] [0.22] [0.591] [0.912] [0.351]
D 2000 -0.894 -0.997 0.214 -0.957 0.084 -0.135 -0.178 0.052
[0] [0] [0.701] [0] [0.596] [0.665] [0.713] [0.835]
D 2001 -0.909 -0.873 0.724 -1.071 0.067 -0.298 -0.521 -0.143
[0] [0.001] [0.007] [0] [0.734] [0.515] [0.465] [0.45]
R - squared 2.6% 4.8% 2.2% 11.5%
N 1262 1247 1032 1247 1032 1247 1021 987 809 987
Wald (joint) 5.513 10.930 3.190 6.761 24.400 15.670 9.084 85.920 59.200 45.900
[0.357] [0.053] [0.671] [0.239] [0.001] [0.028] [0.169] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Wald (time) 438.800 268.300 146.500 288.200 158.900 161.600
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
AR(1) -0.110 -1.537 -1.567 -1.490 -1.552 -1.482 0.006 -0.472 -1.492 -1.430
[0.912] [0.124] [0.117] [0.136] [0.121] [0.138] [0.995] [0.637] [0.136] [0.153]
AR(2) 0.979 0.365 1.075 1.003 1.066 1.016 0.977 -0.334 0.834 0.970
[0.328] [0.715] [0.282] [0.316] [0.286] [0.309] [0.329] [0.738] [0.404] [0.332]
Sargan Test 308.900 1204.000 317.300 1223.000 262.900 1065.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
P-values are reported in brackets.
GMM difference and system estimators use instruments lagged 2 and 3 periods.
GMM results are one step estimates with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and test statistics.
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, asymptotically N(0,1).
The Wald (joint) statistics tests the hypothesis that the coefficients are jointly zero.Table 8 - Effects of Cash Flow and Interactions, Debt in Foreign Curreny and Multilateral Exchange Rate on Investment
Dependent Variable:  I/K 
OLS WG GMM-Diff GMM-Sys GMM-Diff GMM-Sys GMM-Diff GMM-Sys
(I/K) -1 -0.014 -0.275 -0.481 -0.225 -0.063 -0.045 -0.043 -0.033
[0.049] [0] [0] [0] [0.004] [0.001] [0.09] [0.064]
(CF/K) -1 -0.058 0.007 0.862 -0.136 -0.003 0.010 -0.011 0.013
[0.096] [0.896] [0.031] [0.148] [0.828] [0.411] [0.367] [0.236]
(CF/K) -2 0.055 0.243 1.502 0.260 -0.012 0.000 -0.017 0.001
[0.326] [0.074] [0] [0.01] [0.368] [0.995] [0.196] [0.888]
(CF/K) -1 * D D D Dln(RER) 0.432 0.733 -14.441 -3.986
[0.128] [0.212] [0.279] [0.221]
(CF/K) -2 * D D D Dln(RER) 0.112 -0.894 2.093 0.234
[0.603] [0.001] [0.095] [0.626]
[(CF/K) -1 + (CF/K) -2] /2* D D D Dln(RER) * (DFC/K) -1 -0.012 -0.016 -0.007 -0.017
[0.162] [0.147] [0.406] [0.106]
(DFC/K) -1* D D D Dln(RER)  -0.063 -0.033 -0.061 -0.041
[0] [0.145] [0.018] [0.114]
Exp * MultRER -0.206 -0.229 1.098 3.298 0.707 0.200 0.327 0.109
[0.463] [0.84] [0.195] [0.263] [0.332] [0.13] [0.529] [0.343]
Imp * MultRER -0.999 -3.130 1.147 -4.507 0.638 0.390 0.435 0.308
[0.43] [0.128] [0.66] [0.417] [0.376] [0.2] [0.499] [0.259]
Constant 0.354 0.126 -0.287 0.334 -0.654 0.059 -0.147
[0.078] [0.273] [0.237] [0.004] [0] [0.112] [0.01]
Period Dummies
D 90_94 0.572 -0.358 -0.446 -0.502
[0.172] [0.422] [0.002] [0]
D 99_01 -0.437 -0.108 -0.173 0.074
[0.138] [0.646] [0.236] [0.372]
Year Dummies
D 1993 -0.039 -0.857
[0.646] [0.016]
D 1994 -0.209 -0.693
[0.7] [0.252]
D 1995 -0.317 -0.947 0.384
[0.007] [0] [0]
D 1996 -0.246 -0.839 -0.178 0.579
[0.001] [0] [0.407] [0]
D 1997 0.154 -0.418 -0.343 0.499
[0.622] [0.058] [0.081] [0]
D 1998 -0.210 -0.668 -0.145 0.548
[0.009] [0] [0.314] [0]
D 1999 0.642 0.321 -0.556 0.467
[0.279] [0.651] [0.002] [0.004]
D 2000 0.050 -0.208 -0.288 0.542
[0.773] [0.506] [0.242] [0]
D 2001 -0.029 -0.392 -0.369 0.486
[0.893] [0.357] [0] [0]
R - squared 1.5% 11.3%
N 1141 1104 790 952 127 177 127 177
Wald (joint) 21.650 132.900 3642.000 5576.000 51.600 40.100 101.100 247.200
[0.003] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Wald (time) 31.430 52.100 59.500 154.300 -1.576 -1.512
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.115] [0.131]
AR(1) 1.301 0.665 -1.565 -1.092 -1.509 -1.519 0.885 1.151
[0.193] [0.506] [0.118] [0.275] [0.131] [0.129] [0.376] [0.250]
AR(2) 1.311 -0.331 1.650 1.008 0.426 0.448 65.070 284.800
[0.190] [0.741] [0.099] [0.314] [0.670] [0.654] [0.787] [0.000]
Sargan Test 404.000 2041.000 69.870 272.800
[0.000] [0.000] [0.705] [0.000]
P-values are reported in brackets.
GMM difference and system estimators use instruments lagged 2 and 3 periods.
GMM results are one step estimates with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and test statistics.
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, asymptotically N(0,1).
The Wald (joint) statistics tests the hypothesis that the coefficients are jointly zero.Dependent Variable: I/K
OLS WG GMM-Diff GMM-Sys OLS WG GMM-Diff GMM-Sys
(I/K) -1 -0.008 -0.085 -0.026 -0.079 -0.014 -0.433 -0.321 -0.161
[0.761] [0.078] [0.642] [0.281] [0.919] [0.018] [0.207] [0.43]
(DFC/K) -1 0.000 -0.003 -0.052 0.054 -0.094 0.048 0.047 0.158
[0.999] [0.958] [0.417] [0.514] [0.128] [0.703] [0.717] [0.436]
(DFC/K) -1* D D D Dln(RER)  0.009 -0.346 -0.059 -0.677
[0.806] [0.595] [0.929] [0.435]
(DFC/K) -1* [D D D Dln(RER)+ UST+ Country Risk ] 0.395 -0.242 -0.306 -0.714
[0.116] [0.679] [0.604] [0.412]
(DLC/K) -1 0.091 0.141 0.337 -0.033 0.117 0.053 0.154 -0.084
[0.396] [0.57] [0.192] [0.718] [0.212] [0.807] [0.445] [0.402]
(DLC/K) -1* ln(1+r)  -0.700 -0.333 -1.802 0.590 -0.836 0.366 -0.449 1.103
[0.436] [0.837] [0.292] [0.515] [0.292] [0.803] [0.732] [0.294]
Exp * MultRER 0.081 0.474 0.296 0.127 0.086 0.497 0.243 0.111
[0.403] [0.331] [0.466] [0.292] [0.392] [0.37] [0.582] [0.413]
Imp * MultRER 0.086 1.350 0.740 0.535 0.036 1.178 0.348 0.511
[0.668] [0.034] [0.261] [0.208] [0.849] [0.07] [0.666] [0.169]
Constant 2.578 -9.504 14.912 -0.134 0.209 -0.331
[0.709] [0.461] [0.328] [0.304] [0.219] [0.122]
Year Dummies
D 1993 -3.591 -19.433 -16.083
[0.605] [0.061] [0.295]
D 1994 -3.185 -18.978 10.130 -15.687
[0.644] [0.068] [0.433] [0.307]
D 1995 -2.719 -18.529 9.982 -15.205
[0.695] [0.074] [0.437] [0.323]
D 1996 -2.612 -18.369 9.675 -15.036 0.110 0.304 0.206
[0.705] [0.077] [0.453] [0.327] [0.421] [0.023] [0.212]
D 1997 -2.615 -18.319 9.424 -15.084 0.109 0.418 -0.154 0.155
[0.705] [0.077] [0.466] [0.324] [0.459] [0.006] [0.522] [0.383]
D 1998 -2.571 -18.309 9.757 -15.054 0.155 0.361 -0.087 0.116
[0.71] [0.077] [0.448] [0.327] [0.184] [0.019] [0.683] [0.395]
D 1999 -2.647 -18.563 9.358 -15.049 0.031 0.152 -0.261 0.193
[0.703] [0.071] [0.471] [0.324] [0.814] [0.504] [0.283] [0.331]
D 2000 -2.570 -18.470 9.578 -15.044 0.168 0.279 -0.149 0.185
[0.708] [0.074] [0.456] [0.326] [0.288] [0.148] [0.408] [0.267]
D 2001 -2.660 -18.569 9.440 -15.072 0.054 0.169 -0.236 0.186
[0.702] [0.072] [0.463] [0.325] [0.631] [0.406] [0.26] [0.237]
R - squared 26.6% 32.6% 9.2% 19.7%
N 223 188 137 188 205 171 123 171
Wald (joint) 18.350 186.000 63.310 64.700 23.330 49.840 58.370 41.530
[0.010] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Wald (time) 1659.000 971.600 312.700 811.100 3.818 8.628 5.715 2.323
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.701] [0.196] [0.456] [0.888]
AR(1) -1.231 -2.108 -2.119 -1.998 -1.768 -1.938 -2.075 -1.981
[0.218] [0.035] [0.034] [0.046] [0.077] [0.053] [0.038] [0.048]
AR(2) -0.983 -2.307 -0.326 -0.721 -1.295 -2.933 -1.071 -0.436
[0.326] [0.021] [0.745] [0.471] [0.195] [0.003] [0.284] [0.663]
Sargan Test 75.340 267.100 73.340 245.200
[0.999] [0.000] [0.597] [0.000]
P-values are reported in brackets.
GMM difference and system estimators use instruments lagged 2 and 3 periods.
GMM results are one step estimates with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and test statistics.
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, asymptotically N(0,1).
The Wald (joint) statistics tests the hypothesis that the coefficients are jointly zero.
Table 9 - Effects of Debt Currency Composition, Interest Rate and Exchange Rate Movements and Multilateral Exchange Rate on InvestmentDependent Variable:  I/K 
OLS WG OLS WG GMM-Diff GMM-Sys GMM-Diff GMM-Sys
(I/K) -1 0.024 -0.074 0.023 -0.075 -0.034 -0.042 -0.031 -0.044
[0.673] [0.009] [0.679] [0.009] [0.107] [0.005] [0.149] [0.005]
(DFC/K) -1 -0.019 -0.088 -0.018 -0.089 -0.127 -0.029 -0.124 -0.029
[0.099] [0.04] [0.104] [0.041] [0.005] [0.134] [0.006] [0.14]
(DT/K) -1 0.020 0.067 0.020 0.068 0.092 0.028 0.089 0.027
[0.062] [0.035] [0.062] [0.036] [0.011] [0.126] [0.014] [0.133]
(DFC/K) -1 * D D D Dln(RER) -0.010 -0.037 0.004 -0.045 -0.028 -0.041 -0.019 -0.040
[0.618] [0.003] [0.883] [0] [0.129] [0.002] [0.21] [0.001]
(DFC/K) -1 * D D D Dln(RER)² -0.100 0.057 -0.063 -0.007
[0.002] [0.196] [0.312] [0.827]
Exp * MultRER 0.023 0.479 0.025 0.478 0.328 -0.051 0.327 -0.063
[0.788] [0.281] [0.767] [0.281] [0.389] [0.51] [0.392] [0.414]
Imp * MultRER -0.016 1.278 -0.017 1.268 0.802 0.194 0.806 0.204
[0.933] [0.022] [0.93] [0.022] [0.289] [0.559] [0.288] [0.481]
Constant -8.079 -7.820 -1.405 6.983 -0.994 7.297
[0.538] [0.543] [0.775] [0.029] [0.84] [0.024]
Year Dummies
D 1993 7.133 -12.579 6.872 -12.683 -8.005 -8.314
[0.588] [0.123] [0.595] [0.123] [0.013] [0.011]
D 1994 7.451 -12.063 7.211 -12.176 2.138 -7.616 1.732 -7.925
[0.57] [0.141] [0.575] [0.14] [0.663] [0.017] [0.724] [0.014]
D 1995 7.949 -11.671 7.689 -11.774 1.816 -7.157 1.406 -7.468
[0.546] [0.154] [0.551] [0.152] [0.708] [0.028] [0.771] [0.023]
D 1996 8.023 -11.529 7.763 -11.629 1.605 -7.000 1.183 -7.312
[0.541] [0.157] [0.546] [0.156] [0.743] [0.03] [0.809] [0.025]
D 1997 8.021 -11.482 7.762 -11.585 1.359 -7.079 0.951 -7.390
[0.541] [0.161] [0.546] [0.16] [0.786] [0.027] [0.849] [0.022]
D 1998 8.078 -11.487 7.818 -11.586 1.589 -7.028 1.175 -7.339
[0.539] [0.159] [0.544] [0.158] [0.746] [0.03] [0.811] [0.025]
D 1999 7.991 -11.744 7.739 -11.849 1.291 -7.024 0.885 -7.333
[0.544] [0.144] [0.548] [0.143] [0.795] [0.032] [0.858] [0.026]
D 2000 8.071 -11.619 7.810 -11.719 1.504 -7.000 1.088 -7.310
[0.537] [0.154] [0.542] [0.153] [0.759] [0.028] [0.825] [0.023]
D 2001 8.052 -11.730 7.790 -11.832 1.339 -7.012 0.928 -7.321
[0.54] [0.146] [0.545] [0.145] [0.785] [0.03] [0.85] [0.025]
R - squared 23.5% 32.2% 23.7% 32.3%
N 266 225 266 225 162 225 162 225
Wald (joint) 6.338 116.000 20.920 111.500 29.920 39.580 32.690 44.730
[0.386] [0.000] [0.004] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Wald (time) 2170.00 1323.00 2146.00 1328.00 136.60 826.40 132.90 796.10
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
AR(1) -1.05 -2.01 -1.10 -2.01 -2.02 -1.77 -2.02 -1.77
[0.293] [0.045] [0.274] [0.044] [0.043] [0.076] [0.043] [0.076]
AR(2) -0.94 -2.33 -1.05 -2.32 0.03 -0.05 -0.01 -0.07
[0.348] [0.020] [0.293] [0.021] [0.974] [0.957] [0.993] [0.941]
Sargan Test 68.13 224.80 67.60 261.30
[0.996] [0.000] [1.000] [0.000]
P-values are reported in brackets.
GMM difference and system estimators use instruments lagged 2 and 3 periods.
GMM results are one step estimates with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and test statistics.
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, asymptotically N(0,1).
The Wald (joint) statistics tests the hypothesis that the coefficients are jointly zero.
Table 10 - Effects of Debt Currency Composition, Non linear effects of Exchange Rate Movements and Multilateral Exchange Rate on InvestmentDependent Variable:  I/K 
OLS WG GMM-Diff GMM-Sys GMM-Diff GMM-Sys GMM-Diff GMM-Sys
(I/K) -1 -0.159 -0.056 0.065 -0.129 0.034 -0.069 -0.524 -0.171
[0.084] [0.426] [0.594] [0.001] [0.548] [0.1] [0.186] [0.017]
(DST_FC/K) -1 0.053 -0.008 -0.513 0.072 -0.058 0.037 -0.855 0.152
[0.604] [0.936] [0.054] [0.229] [0.545] [0.595] [0.083] [0.157]
(DST_LC/K) -1 -0.361 -0.224 0.055 0.253 -0.134 0.391 0.536 0.417
[0.479] [0.594] [0.928] [0.28] [0.772] [0.153] [0.397] [0.081]
(DLT_FC/K) -1 -0.070 -0.075 -0.222 -0.149 -0.078 -0.166 -0.177 -0.169
[0.083] [0.024] [0.01] [0.007] [0.003] [0] [0.159] [0]
(DLT_LC/K) -1 0.315 1.424 3.037 1.699 1.896 2.281 2.661 1.722
[0.482] [0] [0] [0.035] [0] [0] [0.011] [0.049]
(DST_FC/K) -1*D D D Dln(RER) -1.988 1.006 0.293 -1.546 1.865 -0.833 1.708 -1.983
[0.099] [0.367] [0.83] [0.006] [0.057] [0.102] [0.396] [0.04]
(DST_LC/K) -1*ln(1+r) 2.878 1.826 -5.888 -1.205 1.199 -2.075 -11.937 -2.145
[0.42] [0.494] [0.416] [0.44] [0.684] [0.232] [0.25] [0.173]
(DLT_FC/K) -1*D D D Dln(RER) 0.596 -0.638 0.900 0.252 -0.912 -0.013 1.296 0.240
[0.211] [0.108] [0.345] [0.093] [0.037] [0.946] [0.315] [0.279]
(DLT_LC/K) -1*ln(1+r) 0.609 0.191 -11.382 -6.678 -3.387 -10.234 -11.090 -5.944





Constant -0.833 0.435 -0.764 0.034 -0.081 -6.417 -0.482
[0] [0.004] [0] [0.144] [0.081] [0.174] [0.124]
Period Dummies
D 90_94 -0.447 -0.514
[0.001] [0]
D 99_01 -0.180 -0.020
[0.038] [0.758]
Year Dummies
D 1995 0.391 0.305 0.484 0.502
[0.004] [0.001] [0.001] [0.076]
D 1996 0.661 0.552 -0.339 0.590 6.827 0.680
[0] [0] [0.21] [0] [0.159] [0.002]
D 1997 0.804 0.713 -0.205 0.773 6.657 0.708
[0] [0] [0.192] [0] [0.161] [0.001]
D 1998 0.823 0.504 -0.297 0.784 6.777 0.834
[0] [0] [0.064] [0] [0.158] [0]
D 1999 0.786 0.402 -0.722 0.682 6.015 0.753
[0] [0.004] [0.007] [0] [0.196] [0.003]
D 2000 0.913 0.504 -0.336 0.739 6.527 0.738
[0] [0] [0.114] [0] [0.178] [0.003]
D 2001 0.821 0.456 -0.502 0.645 6.320 0.717
[0] [0.003] [0.005] [0] [0.181] [0.009]
R - squared 40.4% 63.4%
N 171 153 102 153 102 153 94 143
Wald (joint) 199.200 774.000 684.200 81.020 991.800 553.400 2980.000 567.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Wald (time) 80.540 51.530 29.650 74.240 21.560 40.330
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.003] [0.000]
AR(1) -1.471 -3.288 -2.360 -2.750 -2.561 -2.437 -2.069 -2.438
[0.141] [0.001] [0.018] [0.006] [0.010] [0.015] [0.039] [0.015]
AR(2) -1.078 -1.020 0.161 -0.859 -0.586 0.148 1.926
[0.281] [0.308] [0.872] [0.390] [0.558] [0.882] [0.054]
Sargan 4.206 255.100 64.540 199.800 1.401 210.700
[1.000] [0.000] [1.000] [0.354] [1.000] [0.000]
P-values are reported in brackets.
GMM difference and system estimators use instruments lagged 2 and 3 periods.
GMM results are one step estimates with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and test statistics.
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, asymptotically N(0,1).
The Wald (joint) statistics tests the hypothesis that the coefficients are jointly zero.




yes yesTable 12 - Effects of Cash Flow, Debt Currency and Interactions on Cash Flow
Dependent Variable:  CF/K 
OLS WG GMM-Diff GMM-Sys GMM-Diff GMM-Sys GMM-Diff GMM-Sys
(CF/K) -1 -0.424 -1.313 -3.635 -2.399 -2.286 -2.734 -1.557 -2.035
[0.327] [0.068] [0.008] [0.001] [0.136] [0] [0.065] [0.017]
(CF/K) -2 1.304 8.309 -1.947 10.586 -3.166 12.789 9.309 9.051
[0.059] [0.061] [0.351] [0.007] [0.422] [0] [0.058] [0.035]
(DFC/K) -1* D D D Dln(RER) -3.026 -12.113 -0.426 -15.449 3.542 -18.434 -13.373 -13.863
[0.022] [0.046] [0.927] [0.007] [0.635] [0] [0.046] [0.018]
(DLC/K) -1* ln(1+r) 6.776 -8.828 -12.341 2.831 -20.411 0.022 -9.908 7.798





Constant -0.711 1.122 0.344 -2.069 -0.604 -12.463 -0.631 -0.824
[0.039] [0.148] [0.629] [0.052] [0.632] [0.054] [0.038] [0.028]
Period Dummies
D 90_94 -2.497 -1.379
[0.181] [0.202]
D 99_01 2.424 1.802
[0.042] [0.061]
Year Dummies
D 1995 0.101 0.912
[0.76] [0.362]
D 1996 0.447 1.344 -0.804 1.526 0.347 2.201
[0.143] [0.204] [0.246] [0.078] [0.781] [0.089]
D 1997 0.549 1.396 -0.600 1.992 0.354 -0.313
[0.082] [0.136] [0.286] [0.138] [0.763] [0.835]
D 1998 0.376 3.251 -0.194 2.310 1.098 2.186
[0.215] [0.055] [0.82] [0.044] [0.428] [0.146]
D 1999 1.260 0.915 2.391 1.784 2.280 0.677
[0.144] [0.417] [0.355] [0.136] [0.291] [0.696]
D 2000 0.222 1.785 -0.818 4.048 0.388 3.267
[0.543] [0.107] [0.446] [0.016] [0.839] [0.037]
D 2001 0.863 -2.189 1.733 -1.612 0.062
[0.065] [0.209] [0.203] [0.481] [0.978]
3.788 2.705
[0.016] [0.054]
R - squared 19.0% 45.3%
N 258 226 165 226 150 210 165 226
Wald (joint) 5708.000 1058.000 1905.000 194.000 926.700 151.800 3448.000 564.700
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Wald (time) 8.225 5.315 8.020 12.190 4.975 12.440
[0.313] [0.622] [0.331] [0.095] [0.663] [0.087]
AR(1) -1.446 -1.976 -0.771 -1.701 -0.769 -2.061 -1.597 -1.005
[0.148] [0.048] [0.441] [0.089] [0.442] [0.039] [0.110] [0.315]
AR(2) -1.313 -2.162 -0.904 -1.999 -0.834 -1.832 -2.230 -1.840
[0.189] [0.031] [0.366] [0.046] [0.404] [0.067] [0.026] [0.066]
Sargan 1.095 435.400 0.970 117.700 128.000 558.500
[1.000] [0.000] [0.987] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
P-values are reported in brackets.
GMM difference and system estimators use instruments lagged 2 and 3 periods.
GMM results are one step estimates with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and test statistics.
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, asymptotically N(0,1).




yes yesTable 13 - Effects of Cash Flow, Debt Currency and Maturity Composition and Interactions on Cash Flow
Dependent Variable:  CF/K 
OLS WG OLS WG GMM-Diff GMM-Sys GMM-Diff GMM-Sys GMM-Diff GMM-Sys
(CF/K) -1 0.435 -2.056 0.036 -3.295 0.765 0.008 -1.850 -0.095 1.878 -0.044
[0.278] [0.016] [0.908] [0] [0.066] [0.975] [0.024] [0.494] [0.065] [0.848]
(CF/K) -2 -0.505 1.658 2.893 1.170 0.879 3.083 1.398 3.343 0.991 2.948
[0.471] [0.036] [0.01] [0.069] [0.087] [0.008] [0.037] [0] [0.205] [0.021]
(DST_FC/K) -1*D D D Dln(RER) 20.422 10.139 12.495 8.111 4.639 11.739 11.526 11.307 -1.920 12.042
[0] [0] [0.001] [0] [0.04] [0.002] [0] [0] [0.467] [0.002]
(DST_LC/K) -1*ln(1+r) 3.030 6.693 1.384 8.724 21.989 1.409 6.158 4.385 32.476 2.112
[0.228] [0] [0.071] [0] [0.174] [0.156] [0] [0.034] [0.344] [0.002]
(DLT_FC/K) -1*D D D Dln(RER) -8.444 -12.530 -11.214 -13.395 -4.939 -11.324 -12.234 -11.735 -1.336 -11.354
[0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0.385] [0]
(DLT_LC/K) -1*ln(1+r) 14.365 3.176 5.492 0.756 1.608 5.524 4.102 6.046 6.701 6.775









Constant 1.369 1.624 -1.043 1.413 -0.083 -0.508 3.549 2.916
[0.008] [0.017] [0.044] [0.046] [0.192] [0.006] [0.235] [0.018]
Period Dummies
D 90_94 2.054 1.970
[0.063] [0.036]
D 99_01 0.610 0.506
[0.078] [0.038]
Year Dummies
D 1995 -1.972 -1.270 -1.163 -1.404 -1.805 -2.118
[0.004] [0.022] [0.015] [0.045] [0.028] [0.014]
D 1996 -1.827 -1.186 -1.231 -0.868 1.065 -1.896 -3.458 -1.919
[0.005] [0.023] [0.021] [0.064] [0.034] [0.021] [0.237] [0.025]
D 1997 -1.737 -1.220 -1.060 -0.858 0.936 -1.616 -3.698 -1.745
[0.002] [0.01] [0.018] [0.026] [0.068] [0.028] [0.242] [0.024]
D 1998 -1.793 -1.303 -1.019 -1.148 1.043 -1.606 -3.871 -1.609
[0.001] [0.001] [0.023] [0.017] [0.021] [0.026] [0.23] [0.042]
D 1999 -1.867 -0.570 -0.673 -0.313 1.248 -1.209 -3.229 -1.296
[0] [0.138] [0.198] [0.306] [0.029] [0.1] [0.252] [0.117]
D 2000 -1.669 -0.901 -0.946 -0.744 0.995 -1.508 -3.580 -1.478
[0.003] [0.023] [0.048] [0.064] [0.063] [0.054] [0.232] [0.072]
D 2001 -1.747 -0.725 -0.933 -0.538 1.060 -1.476 -3.503 -1.410
[0.001] [0.051] [0.041] [0.125] [0.047] [0.039] [0.232] [0.069]
R - squared 92.3% 98.2% 95.9% 98.6%
N 143 126 136 120 85 126 85 126 79 120
Wald (joint) 92350 220200 427200 159300 667400 150600 409200 3320000 353400 218700
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Wald (time) 17.660 18.640 14.140 16.940 17.130 13.470 4.697 12.560
[0.014] [0.009] [0.049] [0.018] [0.017] [0.062] [0.697] [0.084]
AR(1) 1.921 -2.224 1.625 -2.461 -0.133 -2.420 -1.778 -2.008 -0.342 -1.740
[0.055] [0.026] [0.104] [0.014] [0.894] [0.016] [0.075] [0.045] [0.732] [0.082]
AR(2) 2.308 -1.467 1.126 -1.330 1.341 -1.048 -0.580 -0.550 -0.962 -0.897
[0.021] [0.142] [0.260] [0.183] [0.180] [0.294] [0.562] [0.583] [0.336] [0.370]
Sargan 0.289 55.680 163.500 0.044
[1.000] [0.701] [0.000] [1.000]
P-values are reported in brackets.
GMM difference and system estimators use instruments lagged 2 and 3 periods.
GMM results are one step estimates with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and test statistics.
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, asymptotically N(0,1).




yes yesDependent Variable:  I/K
GMM-Diff GMM-Sys GMM-Diff GMM-Sys GMM-Diff GMM-Sys GMM-Diff GMM-Sys
(I/K) -1 -0.269 -0.093 -0.060 -0.049 -0.271 -0.104 -0.307 -0.111
[0.036] [0.034] [0.282] [0.32] [0.033] [0.017] [0.088] [0.145]
(CF/K) -1 0.129 -0.103 -0.112 -0.233 0.143 -0.094 0.070 0.027
[0.633] [0.363] [0.363] [0.251] [0.59] [0.383] [0.753] [0.783]
(CF/K) -1 * D_90_94 0.749 0.373 0.187 0.201 0.716 0.342 0.565 0.429
[0.316] [0.338] [0.393] [0.393] [0.324] [0.344] [0.342] [0.326]
(CF/K) -1 * D_99_01 0.186 0.193 0.331 0.285 0.240 0.207 0.248 0.021
[0.575] [0.415] [0.192] [0.188] [0.433] [0.376] [0.444] [0.887]
(CF/K) -2 0.315 0.241 0.292 0.221 0.358 0.064
[0.14] [0.208] [0.143] [0.229] [0.239] [0.533]
(CF/K) -2 * D_90_94 -0.604 -0.381 -0.600 -0.365 -0.376 -0.355
[0.326] [0.349] [0.316] [0.324] [0.46] [0.39]
(CF/K) -2 * D_99_01 -0.542 -0.378 -0.510 -0.367 -0.089 -0.293
[0.328] [0.299] [0.341] [0.289] [0.793] [0.401]
(Fin Exp/K) -1 0.168 0.059 0.089 0.045 0.177 0.066 0.108 -0.002
[0.169] [0.314] [0.171] [0.219] [0.149] [0.303] [0.379] [0.972]
(Fin Exp/K) -1 * D_90_94 -0.608 -1.540 -0.016 0.006 -1.386 -1.820 -1.433 -1.527
[0.432] [0.187] [0.707] [0.848] [0.158] [0.137] [0.224] [0.394]
(Fin Exp/K) -1 * D_99_01 -0.010 -0.007 -0.007 0.000 -0.010 -0.011 0.348 0.068






Constant -0.040 0.102 -0.406 -0.296 -0.221 -0.416 -0.043 -1.478
[0.514] [0.3] [0.044] [0.084] [0.277] [0.037] [0.576] [0.502]
Period Dummies
D 90_94 -0.331 0.439 0.110 0.524
[0.444] [0] [0.813] [0]
D 99_01 1.726 0.840 0.927 1.128
[0.028] [0.12] [0.187] [0.079]
N 901 1116 1155 1421 901 1116 823 1025
Wald (joint) 3913.000 8943.000 30.520 100.500 7560.000 18970.000 8933.000 10620.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
AR(1) -1.452 -1.456 -1.555 -1.462 -1.443 -1.462 -1.421 -1.457
[0.146] [0.146] [0.120] [0.144] [0.149] [0.144] [0.155] [0.145]
AR(2) 0.956 0.993 1.055 0.997 0.933 0.992 1.118 1.029
[0.339] [0.321] [0.291] [0.319] [0.351] [0.321] [0.263] [0.303]
Sargan 212.500 1102.000 311.000 1160.000 209.900 1041.000 224.800 638.400
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
P-values are reported in brackets.
GMM difference and system estimators use instruments lagged 2 and 3 periods.
GMM results are one step estimates with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and test statistics.
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, asymptotically N(0,1).
The Wald (joint) statistics tests the hypothesis that the coefficients are jointly zero.
yes yes
Table 14 - Effects of Cash Flow and Financial Expenses on Investment - Subperiods Analysis
yes yes
yes yesDependent Variable: I/K
GMM-Diff GMM-Sys
(I/K) -1 0.044 0.072
[0.762] [0.613]
(DFC/K) -1 -0.332 -0.537
[0.141] [0.068]
(DFC/K) -1 * D_90_94 1.849 2.027
[0.308] [0.248]
(DFC/K) -1 * D_99_01 0.335 0.528
[0.133] [0.068]
(DFC/K) -1* D D D Dln(RER)  5.949 5.589
[0.135] [0.051]
(DFC/K) -1* D D D Dln(RER) * D_90_94 -0.654 -0.718
[0.308] [0.248]
(DFC/K) -1* D D D Dln(RER) * D_99_01 -5.972 -5.620
[0.134] [0.051]
(DLC/K) -1 0.211 -1.552
[0.865] [0.234]
(DLC/K) -1 * D_90_94 -1.310 -1.675
[0.004] [0.001]
(DLC/K) -1 * D_99_01 -0.353 1.662
[0.774] [0.203]
(DLC/K) -1* ln(1+r)  1.353 9.475
[0.81] [0.144]
(DLC/K) -1* ln(1+r) * D_90_94 -0.275 -0.351
[0.004] [0.001]


















P-values are reported in brackets.
GMM difference and system estimators use instruments lagged 2 and 3 periods.
GMM results are one step estimates with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and test statistics.
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, asymptotically N(0,1).
The Wald (joint) statistics tests the hypothesis that the coefficients are jointly zero.
yes yes
Table 15 - Effects of Debt Currency Composition and its interactions with Interest Rate and 
Exchange Rate Movements on Investment - Subperiods Analysis
yes yes
yes yesTable 16 - Effects of Debt Currency and Maturity Composition and Interactions and Multilateral Exchange Rate on Cash Flow - Subperiods Analysis
Dependent Variable: I/K
GMM-Diff GMM-Sys GMM-Diff GMM-Sys GMM-Diff GMM-Sys
(I/K) -1 -0.108 0.044 -0.104 0.050 -0.216 0.051
[0.449] [0.732] [0.499] [0.721] [0.269] [0.713]
(DST_FC/K) -1 0.265 -0.082 0.441 -0.039 0.406 0.068
[0.675] [0.839] [0.469] [0.924] [0.127] [0.848]
(DST_FC/K) -1 * D_90_94 4.514 4.834 5.564 4.458 1.253 2.444
[0.097] [0.061] [0.094] [0.107] [0.569] [0.37]
(DST_FC/K) -1 * D_99_01 -0.516 -0.035 -0.678 -0.077 -0.783 -0.112
[0.421] [0.931] [0.278] [0.849] [0.008] [0.771]
(DST_LC/K) -1 6.242 2.589 5.734 2.653 23.103 8.439
[0.381] [0.375] [0.462] [0.376] [0] [0.125]
(DST_LC/K) -1 * D_90_94 -4.998 -1.258 -5.533 0.142 -7.889 -1.961
[0.011] [0.347] [0.06] [0.875] [0] [0.339]
(DST_LC/K) -1 * D_99_01 -6.529 -2.383 -5.684 -2.470 -23.907 -8.065
[0.348] [0.405] [0.457] [0.403] [0] [0.141]
(DLT_FC/K) -1 0.435 0.206 1.148 0.201 -2.007 -0.530
[0.658] [0.568] [0.374] [0.619] [0.005] [0.415]
(DLT_FC/K) -1 * D_90_94 -3.603 -3.314 -4.775 -0.249 18.373 4.889
[0.475] [0.173] [0.53] [0.94] [0.014] [0.427]
(DLT_FC/K) -1 * D_99_01 -0.506 -0.384 -1.253 -0.380 1.917 0.328
[0.602] [0.294] [0.324] [0.346] [0.005] [0.615]
(DLT_LC/K) -1 1.222 0.026 1.777 0.069 -0.756 -2.110
[0.636] [0.983] [0.528] [0.956] [0.672] [0.23]
(DLT_LC/K) -1 * D_90_94 -0.083 -0.734 0.542 0.180 -0.399 -1.256
[0.822] [0.044] [0.345] [0.677] [0.403] [0.016]
(DLT_LC/K) -1 * D_99_01 1.265 3.167 1.172 3.102 3.424 5.263
[0.661] [0.034] [0.718] [0.059] [0.09] [0.007]
(DST_FC/K) -1 * D D D Dln(RER)  13.910 15.959 18.932 15.926 1.230 8.703
[0.023] [0.01] [0.013] [0.017] [0.725] [0.174]
(DST_FC/K) -1 * D D D Dln(RER) * D_90_94 -1.598 -1.711 -1.970 -1.578 -0.444 -0.865
[0.097] [0.061] [0.094] [0.107] [0.569] [0.37]
(DST_FC/K) -1 * D D D Dln(RER) * D_99_01 -11.168 -15.775 -16.558 -15.797 0.631 -9.238
[0.076] [0.012] [0.028] [0.021] [0.858] [0.168]
(DST_LC/K) -1 * ln(1+r)  -21.800 -15.504 -10.438 -15.255 -102.232 -42.572
[0.56] [0.292] [0.808] [0.308] [0.001] [0.116]
(DST_LC/K) -1 * ln(1+r) * D_90_94 -1.048 -0.264 -1.161 0.030 -1.655 -0.411
[0.011] [0.347] [0.06] [0.875] [0] [0.339]
(DST_LC/K) -1 * ln(1+r) * D_99_01 24.019 14.709 10.467 14.603 107.760 40.656
[0.508] [0.305] [0.804] [0.32] [0] [0.132]
(DLT_FC/K) -1 * D D D Dln(RER)  -10.480 -6.672 -21.598 -6.556 36.600 8.208
[0.556] [0.287] [0.34] [0.339] [0.003] [0.454]
(DLT_FC/K) -1 * D D D Dln(RER) * D_90_94 1.275 1.173 1.690 0.088 -6.504 -1.731
[0.475] [0.173] [0.53] [0.94] [0.014] [0.427]
(DLT_FC/K) -1 * D D D Dln(RER) * D_99_01 9.578 6.503 20.800 6.406 -36.943 -8.252
[0.592] [0.304] [0.358] [0.355] [0.003] [0.452]
(DLT_LC/K) -1 * ln(1+r)  1.166 3.483 -1.034 3.465 12.268 16.435
[0.923] [0.569] [0.938] [0.58] [0.145] [0.081]
(DLT_LC/K) -1 * ln(1+r) * D_90_94 -0.017 -0.154 0.114 0.038 -0.084 -0.264
[0.822] [0.044] [0.345] [0.677] [0.403] [0.016]
(DLT_LC/K) -1 * ln(1+r) * D_99_01 -9.765 -20.533 -12.146 -20.337 -20.949 -32.232






Constant 0.033 -0.112 -0.019 -0.134 0.036 0.041
[0.289] [0.025] [0.634] [0.193] [0.302] [0.87]
Period Dummies
D 90_94 -0.272 -0.634
[0.421] [0.001]
D 99_01 0.352 0.026
[0.035] [0.797]
N 102 153 102 153 94 143
Wald (joint) 3797.000 15590.000 4093.000 22320.000 9045.000 29530.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
AR(1) -2.489 -2.363 -2.430 -2.294 -2.564 -2.627
[0.013] [0.018] [0.015] [0.022] [0.010] [0.009]
AR(2) -1.265 0.034 -1.397 0.389 0.678 1.897
[0.206] [0.973] [0.162] [0.697] [0.498] [0.058]
Sargan 51.830 142.900 49.330 137.300 45.220 116.700
[1.000] [0.978] [1.000] [0.988] [1.000] [1.000]
P-values are reported in brackets.
GMM difference and system estimators use instruments lagged 2 and 3 periods.
GMM results are one step estimates with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and test statistics.
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, asymptotically N(0,1).
The Wald (joint) statistics tests the hypothesis that the coefficients are jointly zero.
yes yes
yes yes
yes yesTable 17 - Analysis of Firm's Hedge Structure
Dependent Variable: I/K
GMM - Diff  GMM - Sys
(I/K) -1 -0.074 -0.048
[0] [0]
(DFC/K) -1 * D D D Dln(RER) -0.078 -0.059
[0.012] [0.002]







D 1994 18.038 -11.005
[0] [0]
D 1995 17.682 -10.675
[0] [0]
D 1996 17.769 -10
[0] [0]
D 1997 18 -10
[0] [0]
D 1999 17.486 -10.487
[0] [0]
D 2000 17.565 -10.354
[0] [0]
D 2001 17.446 -10.429
[0] [0]
N 198 271
Wald (joint) 41.320 56.670
[0.000] [0.000]








P-values are reported in brackets.
GMM difference and system estimators use instruments lagged 2 and 3 periods.
GMM results are one step estimates with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and test statistics.
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, asymptotically N(0,1).
The Wald (joint) statistics tests the hypothesis that the coefficients are jointly zero.Table 18 - Analysis of Firm's Hedge Structure
Dependent Variable: CF/K
GMM - Diff  GMM - Sys GMM - Diff  GMM - Sys
(CF/K) -1 0.545 0.641 0.624 0.638
[0.387] [0.341] [0.306] [0.313]
(CF/K) -2 0.511 0.227
[0.301] [0.524]
(DFC/K) -1 -0.314 -0.263 -0.326 -0.263
[0] [0.017] [0] [0.013]
(DFC/K) -1 * D D D Dln(RER) 3.323 3.420 3.057 3.259
[0.113] [0.123] [0.049] [0.081]
(DFC/K) -1* D D D Dln(RER) * Dhedge -2.705 -2.384 -2.929 -2.523
[0.065] [0.167] [0.057] [0.183]
Constant 0.094 0.260 0.096 0.316
[0.28] [0.08] [0.313] [0.108]
N 177 245 162 223
Wald (joint) 56230.000 67.260 54050.000 1403.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
AR(1) 1.254 1.276 1.342 1.627
[0.210] [0.202] [0.180] [0.104]
AR(2) -1.552 -1.655 -1.690 -1.681
[0.121] [0.098] [0.091] [0.093]
Sargan 201 782 182 687
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
P-values are reported in brackets.
GMM difference and system estimators use instruments lagged 2 and 3 periods.
GMM results are one step estimates with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and test statistics.
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, asymptotically N(0,1).
The Wald (joint) statistics tests the hypothesis that the coefficients are jointly zero.Table A .1. - Effects of Foreign Currency Debt and Exchange Rate Movements on Sales
Dependent Variable:  Sales/K 
OLS WG GMM-Diff GMM-Sys GMM-Diff GMM-Sys
(Sales/K) -1 0.774 -0.280 -1.120 1.415 -0.561 1.209
[0] [0.562] [0.284] [0] [0.518] [0]
(DFC/K) -1 -81.9 33.8 15.4 4.5 -1124.1 -3202.6
[0.491] [0.218] [0.19] [0.929] [0.579] [0.299]
(DT/K) -1 7.7 24.7 40.2 59.2 2265.3 893.0
[0.47] [0.441] [0.289] [0.231] [0.221] [0.188]
(DFC/K) -1 * D D D Dln(RER) 1140.1 346.7 315.1 278.0 2437.4 28683.1
[0.389] [0.33] [0.239] [0.56] [0.716] [0.34]
Exp * D D D Dln(RER) -96360.2 -178531.0
[0.15] [0.249]
Imp * D D D Dln(RER) -108207.0 -67549.1
[0.201] [0.598]
Constant 24406.5 -1039.0 29123.7 9448.8 30639.8
[0.138] [0.314] [0.183] [0.192] [0.336]
Year Dummies
D 1995 -24339.6 -8497.1 -37309.0 -38778.0
[0.139] [0.273] [0.18] [0.25]
D 1996 -24304.5 -8400.7 154.3 -32902.0 -5927.8 -36750.0
[0.138] [0.271] [0.943] [0.155] [0.322] [0.269]
D 1997 -21881.8 -4079.5 25858.5 -40534.1 13139.1 -41570.7
[0.13] [0.508] [0.167] [0.12] [0.281] [0.195]
D 1998 -25911.2 -12674.3 -9032.0 -43528.8 -19354.5 -43842.8
[0.131] [0.167] [0.221] [0.127] [0.2] [0.2]
D 1999 -24624.5 -11114.1 513.0 -30519.6 11126.9 -6568.9
[0.139] [0.234] [0.587] [0.181] [0.194] [0.874]
D 2000 -24264.4 -11649.0 1076.1 -30407.9 -22570.5 -29476.2
[0.139] [0.235] [0.261] [0.181] [0.163] [0.365]
D 2001 -30503.3 -16550.8 -4327.6 -41647.9 -21936.8 -37912.0
[0.146] [0.224] [0.209] [0.188] [0.148] [0.385]
R - squared 73.9% 10.4%
N 329 277 199 277 132 184
Wald (joint) 102.700 2.279 3.990 1030.000 3.114 2104.000
[0.000] [0.685] [0.407] [0.000] [0.794] [0.000]
Wald (time) 4.169 3.450 3.560 4.523 2.858 5.119
[0.760] [0.841] [0.829] [0.718] [0.898] [0.645]
AR(1) -1.232 -1.451 -1.211 0.974 -1.245 0.977
[0.218] [0.147] [0.226] [0.330] [0.213] [0.329]
AR(2) -0.459 0.582 -0.742 -0.987 -1.383 -0.626
[0.646] [0.560] [0.458] [0.324] [0.167] [0.531]
Sargan 4.032 42.500 20.050 60.610
[0.999] [0.924] [0.891] [0.996]
P-values are reported in brackets.
GMM difference and system estimators use instruments lagged 2 and 3 periods.
GMM results are one step estimates with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and test statistics.
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, asymptotically N(0,1).
The Wald (joint) statistics tests the hypothesis that the coefficients are jointly zero.Table A .2. - Effects of Foreign Currency Debt and Exchange Rate Movements on Investment
Dependent Variable:  I/K 
OLS WG GMM-Diff GMM-Sys GMM-Diff GMM-Sys GMM-Diff GMM-Sys
(I/K) -1 0.063 -0.089 -0.072 -0.050 -0.034 -0.042 -0.072 -0.046
[0.434] [0] [0] [0] [0.107] [0.005] [0] [0]
(DFC/K) -1 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.127 -0.029 0.001 0.001
[0.57] [0.275] [0.405] [0.561] [0.005] [0.134] [0.344] [0.4]
(DT/K) -1 0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.092 0.028 -0.002 0.000
[0.826] [0.624] [0.296] [0.665] [0.011] [0.126] [0.25] [0.599]
(DFC/K) -1 * D D D Dln(RER) -0.005 -0.024 -0.025 -0.023 -0.028 -0.041 -0.026 -0.025
[0.719] [0.196] [0.103] [0.057] [0.129] [0.002] [0.111] [0.029]
Exp * MultRER 0.328 -0.051
[0.389] [0.51]




Constant -15.695 -17.147 10.784 -1.405 6.983 -17.117 9.844
[0.405] [0] [0] [0.775] [0.029] [0] [0]
Year Dummies
D 1993 14.794 -20.980 -11.785 -8.005 -10.842
[0.434] [0] [0] [0.013] [0]
D 1994 15.077 -20.564 17.741 -11.365 2.138 -7.616 17.775 -10.441
[0.424] [0] [0] [0] [0.663] [0.017] [0] [0]
D 1995 15.561 -20.168 17.523 -11.002 1.816 -7.157 17.505 -10.046
[0.41] [0] [0] [0] [0.708] [0.028] [0] [0]
D 1996 15.636 -20.010 17.362 -10.815 1.605 -7.000 17.345 -9.874
[0.407] [0] [0] [0] [0.743] [0.03] [0] [0]
D 1997 15.656 -19.986 17.251 -10.849 1.359 -7.079 17.215 -9.911
[0.406] [0] [0] [0] [0.786] [0.027] [0] [0]
D 1998 15.770 -19.892 17.303 -10.740 1.589 -7.028 17.286 -9.785
[0.403] [0] [0] [0] [0.746] [0.03] [0] [0]
D 1999 15.635 -19.967 17.184 -10.818 1.291 -7.024 17.114 -9.863
[0.407] [0] [0] [0] [0.795] [0.032] [0] [0]
D 2000 15.729 -19.898 17.223 -10.738 1.504 -7.000 17.209 -9.797
[0.403] [0] [0] [0] [0.759] [0.028] [0] [0]
D 2001 15.682 -19.962 17.103 -10.757 1.339 -7.012 17.065 -9.814
[0.406] [0] [0] [0] [0.785] [0.03] [0] [0]
R - squared 21.4% 27.7%
N 380 325 234 325 162 225 234 325
Wald (joint) 0.860 23.910 37.590 60.390 29.920 39.580 33.170 46.230
[0.930] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Wald (time) 5466.00 69160000.00 946.30 3030.00 136.60 826.40 283.30 1605.00
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
AR(1) -0.909 -2.255 -1.908 -1.838 -2.024 -1.773 -1.936 -1.854
[0.363] [0.024] [0.056] [0.066] [0.043] [0.076] [0.053] [0.064]
AR(2) -0.467 -2.556 -0.141 -0.824 0.033 -0.054 -0.119 -0.787
[0.640] [0.011] [0.888] [0.410] [0.974] [0.957] [0.905] [0.432]
Sargan Test 55.240 215.400 68.130 224.800 65.470 244.800
[0.867] [0.000] [0.996] [0.000] [0.943] [0.000]
P-values are reported in brackets.
GMM difference and system estimators use instruments lagged 2 and 3 periods.
GMM results are one step estimates with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and test statistics.
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, asymptotically N(0,1).
The Wald (joint) statistics tests the hypothesis that the coefficients are jointly zero.Table A .3. - Effects of Cash Flow, Total Debt and Multilateral Exchange Rate on Investment with Controls
Dependent Variable:  I/K 
OLS WG GMM-Diff GMM-Sys GMM-Diff GMM-Sys GMM-Diff GMM-Sys GMM-Diff GMM-Sys
(I/K) -1 -0.002 -0.044 -0.830 -0.057 -0.845 -0.402 -0.846 -0.282 -0.862 -0.228
[0.71] [0.345] [0.001] [0.403] [0] [0.004] [0] [0.003] [0] [0.006]
(CF/K) -1 -0.043 0.046 0.234 -0.067 0.033 -0.181 0.128 -0.118 0.085 -0.103
[0.139] [0.293] [0.339] [0.651] [0.77] [0.304] [0.273] [0.197] [0.026] [0.051]
(CF/K) -2 0.183 -0.191 0.208 0.047 0.155 0.037
[0.354] [0.081] [0.361] [0.485] [0.499] [0.397]
(DT/K) -1 0.017 0.003 0.017 0.006
[0.004] [0.627] [0] [0.01]
Exp * MultRER 2.272 -0.030
[0.335] [0.967]
Imp * MultRER 7.183 0.341
[0.174] [0.884]
Size 0.160 0.177 -4.431 6.198 -2.462 9.363 -2.372 3.975 -1.965 3.498







Constant 0.906 -1.144 0.821 0.777 1.226 -17.799 0.830 -8.255 0.744 -3.896
[0] [0] [0.346] [0.916] [0.712] [0.05] [0.716] [0.104] [0.731] [0.348]
Year Dummies
D 1992 -0.699 -4.491
[0.008] [0.314]
D 1993 -0.905 -1.306 1.629 -6.320 -9.063 -3.342 -2.804
[0] [0] [0.381] [0.208] [0.095] [0.141] [0.087]
D 1994 -1.911 -2.214 2.792 -15.567 0.492 -16.809 1.047 -7.025 0.963 -5.880
[0] [0] [0.291] [0.038] [0.659] [0.054] [0.51] [0.1] [0.442] [0.051]
D 1995 -1.523 -1.790 -0.590 -16.747 -1.456 -17.621 -1.093 -7.150 -1.196 -5.979
[0] [0] [0.413] [0.04] [0.628] [0.058] [0.598] [0.123] [0.572] [0.065]
D 1996 -1.508 -1.722 -0.064 -16.664 -0.645 -18.098 -0.196 -7.407 -0.064 -6.263
[0] [0] [0.914] [0.039] [0.832] [0.057] [0.921] [0.116] [0.972] [0.067]
D 1997 -1.107 -1.348 -0.978 -15.360 -0.506 -17.252 -0.171 -6.709 -0.055 -5.572
[0] [0.002] [0.43] [0.048] [0.863] [0.064] [0.931] [0.147] [0.976] [0.078]
D 1998 -1.407 -1.656 -0.715 -16.123 -1.230 -17.581 -0.843 -7.054 -0.954 -6.056
[0] [0] [0.35] [0.043] [0.708] [0.062] [0.705] [0.132] [0.669] [0.068]
D 1999 -0.912 -1.149 -0.318 -16.354 -0.736 -17.470 -0.316 -6.535 -1.492 -5.659
[0.006] [0.035] [0.697] [0.041] [0.813] [0.062] [0.882] [0.148] [0.627] [0.059]
D 2000 -1.338 -1.602 -0.829 -17.514 -1.221 -17.692 -0.893 -6.900 -0.667 -6.224
[0] [0] [0.281] [0.037] [0.715] [0.061] [0.691] [0.141] [0.733] [0.064]
D 2001 -1.395 -1.682 -1.140 -18.413 -1.709 -18.872 -1.362 -7.561 -1.828 -6.779
[0] [0] [0.291] [0.034] [0.624] [0.06] [0.588] [0.133] [0.51] [0.062]
R - squared 2.8% 4.1%
N 1448 1411 1161 1411 919 1123 910 1110 733 894
Wald (joint) 9.786 7.133 14.300 10.290 1107.000 31.000 467.000 38.160 560.300 30.890
[0.134] [0.309] [0.026] [0.113] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001]
Wald (time) 456.300 315.200 14.380 7.831 45.490 4.524 39.740 7.645 49.630 11.430
[0.000] [0.000] [0.156] [0.645] [0.000] [0.874] [0.000] [0.570] [0.000] [0.247]
AR(1) -0.536 -1.496 -1.180 -1.650 -0.796 -2.609 -0.791 -1.715 -0.598 -1.532
[0.592] [0.135] [0.238] [0.099] [0.426] [0.009] [0.429] [0.086] [0.550] [0.125]
AR(2) 0.983 0.410 -0.822 0.872 -1.060 -0.154 -1.167 0.643 -1.189 0.831
[0.326] [0.682] [0.411] [0.383] [0.289] [0.877] [0.243] [0.520] [0.234] [0.406]
Sargan Test 17.340 30.700 96.790 76.790 117.300 494.400 125.700 1094.000
[0.001] [0.163] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
P-values are reported in brackets.
GMM difference and system estimators use instruments lagged 2 and 3 periods.
GMM results are one step estimates with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and test statistics.
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, asymptotically N(0,1).






yes yes yes yes yes yes
yes yes yes yes
yes yes yes yesTable A .4. - Effects of Cash Flow and Interactions, Total Debt, Expected Profitability and Multilateral Exchange Rate on Investment
Dependent Variable:  I/K 
OLS WG GMM-Diff GMM-Sys GMM-Diff GMM-Sys GMM-Diff GMM-Sys GMM-Diff GMM-Sys GMM-Diff GMM-Sys
(I/K) -1 -0.010 -0.047 -0.053 -0.045 -0.270 -0.112 -0.493 -0.239 -0.268 -0.108 -0.481 -0.225
[0.326] [0.346] [0.355] [0.27] [0.011] [0.01] [0] [0] [0.013] [0.015] [0] [0]
(CF/K) -1 -0.049 0.027 0.100 -0.006 0.507 0.024 0.806 -0.154 0.545 0.011 0.862 -0.136
[0.102] [0.703] [0.358] [0.83] [0.058] [0.303] [0.029] [0.158] [0.037] [0.644] [0.031] [0.148]
(CF/K) -2 0.561 0.177 1.511 0.270 0.578 0.196 1.502 0.260
[0.089] [0.014] [0] [0.016] [0.079] [0.045] [0] [0.01]
(CF/K) -1 * D D D Dln(RER) 0.059 0.215 -0.156 -0.008 -2.481 -0.149 -13.356 -3.483 -2.839 -0.259 -14.441 -3.986
[0.806] [0.838] [0.714] [0.981] [0.29] [0.564] [0.261] [0.161] [0.205] [0.396] [0.279] [0.221]
(CF/K) -2 * D D D Dln(RER) -0.446 -0.411 2.090 0.270 -0.518 -0.394 2.093 0.234
[0.615] [0.206] [0.062] [0.546] [0.561] [0.323] [0.095] [0.626]
(DT/K) -1 0.005 -0.013 -0.002 0.002 0.004 0.004 -0.009 -0.008 0.004 0.002 -0.007 -0.008
[0.124] [0.001] [0.788] [0.673] [0.308] [0.12] [0.004] [0.232] [0.506] [0.346] [0.026] [0.216]
(Sales/K) -1 
** -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
[0.571] [0.205] [0.002] [0.036]
Q Tobin 0.003 0.004
[0.352] [0.201]
Exp * MultRER -0.383 -2.584 -0.804 -0.572 0.411 -0.020 2.332 4.749 0.650 -0.102 1.098 3.298
[0.207] [0.291] [0.628] [0.412] [0.773] [0.965] [0.053] [0.296] [0.669] [0.821] [0.195] [0.263]
Imp * MultRER -1.035 -7.849 -5.029 -2.642 -0.441 -2.146 10.301 -5.959 -1.100 -2.571 1.147 -4.507
[0.417] [0.109] [0.248] [0.121] [0.868] [0.219] [0.049] [0.429] [0.656] [0.234] [0.66] [0.417]
Constant 1.405 -0.832 1.767 -0.339 0.643 -0.704 -0.821 -0.336 0.889 0.126 -0.287
[0] [0] [0.001] [0] [0.022] [0.009] [0.497] [0.015] [0.006] [0.273] [0.237]
Period Dummies
D 90_94 0.572 -0.358
[0.172] [0.422]
D 99_01 -0.437 -0.108
[0.138] [0.646]
Year Dummies
D 1992 -0.633 -1.156 -0.622
[0.027] [0] [0.018]
D 1993 -0.981 -1.404 0.515 -1.037 -0.197 -0.209 -0.270
[0] [0] [0.178] [0] [0.064] [0.311] [0.087]
D 1994 -1.357 -2.110 0.369 -1.332 0.070 -0.272 0.433 -0.220 0.027 -0.307
[0.001] [0.004] [0.568] [0.003] [0.852] [0.576] [0.13] [0.755] [0.944] [0.597]
D 1995 -0.429 -1.009 0.900 -0.547 -0.264 -0.580 0.088 -0.020 -0.398 -0.719
[0.626] [0.053] [0.081] [0.46] [0.642] [0.002] [0.786] [0.977] [0.578] [0.001]
D 1996 -1.233 -1.747 1.527 -1.159 0.563 -0.470 1.101 0.144 0.618 -0.624
[0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0.858] [0] [0]
D 1997 -0.872 -1.646 0.005 -1.223 0.907 -0.029 1.236 0.744 0.859 -0.125
[0.003] [0.015] [0.996] [0.041] [0.044] [0.945] [0.014] [0.514] [0.115] [0.792]
D 1998 -1.199 -1.805 0.651 -1.345 -0.056 -0.357 0.378 0.412 -0.066 -0.481
[0] [0.001] [0.057] [0] [0.808] [0.115] [0.168] [0.661] [0.807] [0.056]
D 1999 -0.417 0.244 2.086 -0.327 0.907 0.463 -0.788 0.110 1.204 0.736
[0.471] [0.766] [0.042] [0.551] [0.328] [0.489] [0.188] [0.898] [0.238] [0.425]
D 2000 -0.995 -0.777 0.054 -1.010 -0.218 -0.051 0.910 0.046 -0.507 -0.175
[0] [0.012] [0.926] [0] [0.625] [0.863] [0.007] [0.946] [0.34] [0.591]
D 2001 -1.001 -0.340 0.988 -0.954 0.109 -0.171 -0.135 -0.238 0.102 -0.272
[0] [0.568] [0.003] [0] [0.745] [0.549] [0.735] [0.718] [0.742] [0.416]
R - squared 0.6% 2.0%
N 1347 1335 1124 1335 870 1045 809 976 709 865 790 952
Wald (joint) 12.620 155.500 13.990 3.646 338.500 346.400 4167.000 3387.000 555.800 1662.000 3642.000 5576.000
[0.050] [0.000] [0.030] [0.724] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Wald (time) 162.500 39.280 89.440 156.400 61.740 66.230 37.830 45.270 49.310 36.020
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
AR(1) -1.400 -1.859 -1.834 -1.785 -1.730 -1.529 -1.380 -1.070 -1.696 -1.525 -1.565 -1.092
[0.162] [0.063] [0.067] [0.074] [0.084] [0.126] [0.168] [0.285] [0.090] [0.127] [0.118] [0.275]
AR(2) 1.324 -0.408 1.413 1.351 1.060 1.157 1.581 1.015 1.016 1.160 1.650 1.008
[0.186] [0.684] [0.158] [0.177] [0.289] [0.247] [0.114] [0.310] [0.310] [0.246] [0.099] [0.314]
Sargan Test 754.600 3149.000 301.800 1213.000 511.100 1732.000 253.700 1027.000 404.000 2041.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
P-values are reported in brackets.
GMM difference and system estimators use instruments lagged 2 and 3 periods.
GMM results are one step estimates with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and test statistics.
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, asymptotically N(0,1).
The Wald (joint) statistics tests the hypothesis that the coefficients are jointly zero.
** Multiplied by 1000.Table A .5. - Effects of Debt Currency Composition, Interest Rate and Exchange Rate Movements and Multilateral Exchange Rate on Investment
Dependent Variable:  I/K 
OLS WG OLS WG GMM-Diff GMM-Sys GMM-Diff GMM-Sys
(I/K) -1 -0.037 -0.080 -0.156 -0.441 -0.009 -0.058 -0.323 -0.266
[0.008] [0.117] [0.37] [0.025] [0.875] [0.189] [0.224] [0.231]
(DFC/K) -1 -0.005 -0.006 -0.032 0.048 -0.090 0.018 -0.005 0.056
[0.271] [0.924] [0.713] [0.724] [0.178] [0.745] [0.97] [0.662]
(DFC/K) -1* D D D Dln(RER)  -0.017 -0.347 0.209 -0.332
[0.215] [0.62] [0.734] [0.572]
(DFC/K) -1* [D D D Dln(RER)+ UST+Country Risk ] 0.145 -0.240 -0.101 -0.210
[0.664] [0.694] [0.857] [0.692]
(DLC/K) -1 -0.014 0.177 -0.028 0.067 0.433 -0.016 0.227 -0.158
[0.844] [0.524] [0.759] [0.781] [0.16] [0.838] [0.369] [0.173]
(DLC/K) -1* ln(1+r)  0.298 -0.620 0.436 0.243 -2.354 0.439 -0.894 1.679
[0.644] [0.732] [0.59] [0.88] [0.242] [0.595] [0.575] [0.149]
Exp * MultRER 0.076 0.402 0.091 0.373 0.383 0.160 0.286 0.139
[0.445] [0.457] [0.404] [0.544] [0.439] [0.26] [0.609] [0.453]
Imp * MultRER 0.182 1.544 0.144 1.500 1.284 0.485 0.892 0.285
[0.412] [0.031] [0.538] [0.034] [0.041] [0.217] [0.185] [0.405]
SIZE 0.018 -0.061 0.028 0.025 -0.005 0.148 0.146 0.148







Constant -0.782 -0.389 0.510 -1.302 0.203 -0.860
[0] [0.151] [0.036] [0] [0.333] [0.048]
Year Dummies
D 1995 0.493 0.459 0.538
[0] [0.004] [0.001]
D 1996 0.554 0.557 0.112 0.225 -0.351 0.610 0.187
[0] [0] [0.481] [0.166] [0.384] [0] [0.347]
D 1997 0.555 0.666 0.118 0.377 -0.536 0.622 -0.113 0.198
[0] [0] [0.478] [0.024] [0.064] [0] [0.698] [0.25]
D 1998 0.619 0.647 0.178 0.317 -0.329 0.641 -0.124 0.136
[0] [0] [0.2] [0.096] [0.243] [0] [0.643] [0.441]
D 1999 0.533 0.403 0.079 0.112 -0.754 0.600 -0.376 0.146
[0] [0.08] [0.608] [0.596] [0.012] [0] [0.235] [0.467]
D 2000 0.620 0.496 0.197 0.244 -0.368 0.635 -0.092 0.224
[0] [0] [0.296] [0.207] [0.221] [0] [0.675] [0.316]
D 2001 0.548 0.405 0.113 0.135 -0.610 0.579 -0.273 0.177
[0] [0.043] [0.446] [0.493] [0.008] [0] [0.306] [0.34]
R - squared 19.0% 28.0% 5.0% 19.3%
N 200 167 187 154 119 167 109 154
Wald (joint) 42.340 204.000 45.790 61.790 81.610 141.400 43.230 16.420
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.126]
Wald (time) 320.700 65.190 2.937 6.621 56.630 135.900 2.518 2.363
[0.000] [0.000] [0.817] [0.357] [0.000] [0.000] [0.866] [0.883]
AR(1) -1.365 -2.099 -1.958 -2.089 -1.954 -1.909 -1.903 -1.844
[0.172] [0.036] [0.050] [0.037] [0.051] [0.056] [0.057] [0.065]
AR(2) -2.253 -2.570 -2.338 -3.350 1.242 0.900 0.785 0.989
[0.024] [0.010] [0.019] [0.001] [0.214] [0.368] [0.433] [0.322]
Sargan Test 67.770 298.400 63.100 278.700
[0.937] [0.000] [0.789] [0.000]
P-values are reported in brackets.
GMM difference and system estimators use instruments lagged 2 and 3 periods.
GMM results are one step estimates with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and test statistics.
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, asymptotically N(0,1).









yes yesDependent Variable: I/K
GMM-Diff GMM-Sys GMM-Diff GMM-Sys
(I/K) -1 -0.001 0.108 -0.082 -0.063
[0.993] [0.222] [0.557] [0.64]
(DFC/K) -1 -0.314 -0.249 -0.316 -0.067
[0.138] [0.097] [0.158] [0.703]
(DFC/K) -1 * D_90_94 -619.135 -833.845 -374.862 -289.767
[0] [0] [0.022] [0.095]
(DFC/K) -1 * D_99_01 0.319 0.233 0.315 0.057
[0.125] [0.111] [0.149] [0.748]
(DFC/K) -1* D D D Dln(RER)  3.142 2.252 3.805 1.533
[0.049] [0.193] [0.04] [0.389]
(DFC/K) -1* D D D Dln(RER) * D_90_94 -1751.900 -2356.440 -1063.580 -820.669
[0] [0] [0.021] [0.094]
(DFC/K) -1* D D D Dln(RER) * D_99_01 -3.171 -2.291 -3.830 -1.566
[0.047] [0.191] [0.039] [0.381]
(DLC/K) -1 -0.402 -0.217 -0.295 0.172
[0.424] [0.62] [0.559] [0.758]
(DLC/K) -1 * D_90_94 -614.388 -824.131 -372.595 -288.218
[0] [0] [0.02] [0.088]
(DLC/K) -1 * D_99_01 0.287 0.427 0.300 -0.012
[0.562] [0.285] [0.536] [0.981]
(DLC/K) -1* ln(1+r)  3.681 0.938 3.247 -1.082
[0.195] [0.742] [0.246] [0.757]
(DLC/K) -1* ln(1+r) * D_90_94 2924.370 3924.270 1776.360 1375.740
[0] [0] [0.019] [0.086]
(DLC/K) -1* ln(1+r) * D_99_01 -2.857 -2.663 -3.252 -0.146





Constant 0.060 0.029 0.026 -0.087
[0.035] [0.309] [0.61] [0.185]
Period Dummies
D 90_94 -0.580 -0.693
[0.065] [0.028]
D 99_01 0.071 0.179
[0.594] [0.023]
N 206 282 206 282
Wald (joint) 384.900 1629.000 422.700 1855.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
AR(1) -2.147 -2.154 -2.230 -2.263
[0.032] [0.031] [0.026] [0.024]
AR(2) -0.734 -0.969 -0.427 -0.405
[0.463] [0.333] [0.669] [0.686]
Sargan 63.550 211.000 65.050 215.700
[0.864] [0.000] [0.787] [0.000]
P-values are reported in brackets.
GMM difference and system estimators use instruments lagged 2 and 3 periods.
GMM results are one step estimates with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and test statistics.
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, asymptotically N(0,1).
The Wald (joint) statistics tests the hypothesis that the coefficients are jointly zero.
Table A .6. - Effects of Debt Currency Composition and its interactions with Interest Rate and Exchange Rate 
Movements on Investment - Subperiods Analysis